

# Strengthening the Africa-EU partnership through action on climate impacts

**The importance of gender transformative approaches to adaptation and loss and damage**

Climate Action Network (CAN) Europe Briefing



# 1.

## Introduction

At the 6th AU-EU Summit held in February 2022 the European Union (EU) and African Union (AU) affirmed a joint partnerships vision for 2030. This briefing looks at the Partnership and the financing underpinning it from the perspective of climate justice, and how the EU and AU urgently need to build on what was agreed and deepen cooperation to progress gender transformative action on adaptation and to address loss and damage.

The [IPCC 6th Assessment Report](#) are unequivocal that dangerous climate impacts are increasing and we are in the era of loss and damage, especially in developing countries. Africa's particular vulnerability to climate impacts, on account of its geography, climate-sensitive economic sectors, colonial legacy and on-going neo-colonial extraction, is made ever clearer by the compounding effects of climate change on food, water and health crises hitting communities in multiple African regions. Climate change also heightens the risk of conflict in climate fragile African countries and threatens human rights, including specific rights of women and LGBTQI people. Vulnerability increases at the intersection of gender with other social inequities including race, ethnicity, income, disability and age. Despite this, the new Partnership Agreement lacks sufficient attention to climate impacts, and their gendered and unequal effects on vulnerable communities.

This matters not just for climate justice, but because African women, girls, and Indigenous Peoples are demonstrating exceptional solutions to protecting the natural environment and fighting climate change through gender transformative approaches. The Partnership should now learn from the vitality of civil society and community work shown around COP27, and take a stronger approach to supporting gender transformative African-led approaches and enable African ownership from local-level up. More integrated approaches to climate action across nature, health, agriculture, peace-building and displacement are key.

This briefing builds on analysis of the Partnership commitments, EU financing commitments and programming process, and programmes for five selected African programmes. It also benefits from invaluable inputs from African and European civil society organisations (CSOs) to draw conclusions and recommendations for the EU on the Partnership and its financing.

Front cover image: Rural women from cooperatives plant a vitamin-rich tree called Moringa, clean, dry and sell its leaves in Tristao Islands, Guinea. Credit: Joe Saade / UN Women. [Creative Commons License](#)

# 2.

## Institutional Priorities of the African Union and European Union

Strengthening its climate partnership with Africa should be a clear priority for the EU. Considering the EU's historical responsibility for the climate crisis, economic capacity and the impact of colonial legacy, as a matter of justice the EU holds a particular responsibility to provide finance resources to Africa to address climate change and achieve sustainable development. Equitable climate financing is the bedrock for a more successful partnership. On top of this there are many areas of convergence between the two partners' climate agendas which offer fruitful areas for cooperation, including around climate financing for adaptation and gender equality objectives.

In 2009 developed countries committed to provide \$100 billion per year by 2020 to support developing countries to mitigate and adapt to climate change. This commitment was later extended from 2020-25, and countries agreed to aim at a balance in finance for adaptation and mitigation, especially supporting the most vulnerable countries and communities such as least developed countries (LDCs) and small island developing States (SIDS).<sup>1</sup> However \$100 billion has not yet been delivered annually and is not projected to be reached until 2023 (OECD, 2022). The EU collectively (including the European Commission, EIB and Member States bilateral and multilateral contributions) is the world's largest climate finance contributor, and should have a special role to set the direction of travel on climate finance flows. However it are not yet achieving a balance in mitigation and adaptation finance (Council of the EU, 2021). Moreover rich countries including the EU have blocked progress on developing commitments to address loss and damage called for by developing countries at the UNFCCC, despite needs and gaps in the financial architecture, which have been made even clearer by the first Glasgow Dialogue on Loss and Damage (OI, 2022). This leaves the African Union's and African countries' strategic priorities on climate impacts severely underfunded, and frontline communities left to shoulder the costs.

Analysis of selected African national plans finds they are investing on average the equivalent of 2.8% of GDP on adapting to climate change (Powershift Africa, 2022). The AU's [Draft Africa Climate Change Strategy 2020-30](#) overall objective is the 'Achievement of the Agenda 2063 Vision by building the resilience of the African continent to the impacts of climate change,' recognising the need for people-driven development and the importance of gender equity and youth. African-led initiatives include the [African Adaptation Initiative](#) which aims to enhance climate information services; strengthen policies and institutions; enhance on the ground action; and increase access to and mobilizing climate finance and investment; the [African Risk Capacity](#), which helps African governments improve their capacities to plan, prepare for and respond to extreme weather events and natural disasters through predominantly insurance-based approaches and has a goal to transform DRM approaches towards gender equality; and the [African Development Bank](#) (AfDB) which allocates the largest share of its climate finance to adaptation, and its [gender strategy](#) which is starting to result in gender-transformative calls for financing including via its African Climate Change Fund. At the UNFCCC African parties put a great focus on the need to progress the Global Goal on Adaptation. They have also called for further action to address loss and damage through the establishment of a UNFCCC financing facility to address loss and damage. At COP26 the Glasgow Dialogues on Loss and Damage were established as a 'compromise' but this process is not mandated to result in a decision between parties (TWN, 2021).

Collectively the EU is the largest climate finance contributor to African countries and the African continent, and it currently contributes to several African-led initiatives. However these contributions are dwarfed by financing needs. And more recently a focus on the EU-centric European Green Deal which centres mitigation has compromised relations, and further action is needed to align the

<sup>1</sup> The \$100 billion climate finance goal was identified in 2009 Copenhagen Accords by decision 2/CP.15 and formalized in the 2010 Cancun Agreements via decision 1/CP.16, IV, A, 98. It was reaffirmed and extended from 2020-25 in Paragraph 114 of decision 1/CP.21; further aims were set out in Article 9.4 of the Paris Agreement

Partnership and its initiatives towards African priorities and needs of frontline communities on climate impacts. Fortunately there are many areas of convergence to build on including the [EU Adaptation Strategy](#) and its [Gender Action Plan III](#)'s commitments to gender mainstreaming and taking gender transformative action to shift gender-power relations, but this will require greater coherence in its approach to the Partnership, its climate diplomacy and Global Gateway financing strategy. Several EU member states have helped drive forward progress on international adaptation finance, including through the [Adaptation Champions Group](#) which includes the AfDB amongst its members. Regarding loss and damage the EU supports the establishment of the [UNFCCC Santiago Network on Loss and Damage](#), a clear priority of the African Group of Negotiators (AGN) to catalyze access to technical assistance on loss and damage to developing countries, for effective implementation of the functions of the Warsaw International Mechanism. When it comes to climate financing the EU has focused on averting (mitigation) and minimizing (adaptation) and largely neglected action to address loss and damage. It has provided some support to disaster and climate risk initiatives which fall into the category of addressing loss and damage, predominantly insurance-based approaches, where Germany has played a particular role in development of the [Insuresilience Global](#)

[Partnership \(IGP\)](#). Importantly EU Member States in the G7 in 2022 under the German Presidency committed to “scale up finance for climate and disaster risk finance and insurance (CDRFI)” and a new “Global Shield” initiative which must also include measures to address loss and damage (G7, 2022), and EU Finance Ministers agreed to strengthen action and support to avert, minimize and address loss and damage (Council of the EU, 2022). Denmark became the first member state to pledge finance to address loss and damage (\$13 million ) in September 2022 and the European Parliament has called for the EU to provide finance to address loss and damage (European Parliament, 2022). Individual member states and the EU collectively must now find a way to deliver on those commitments.

Scaled-up financing for adaptation and to address loss and damage is essential from a climate justice perspective. Moreover as work at the UNFCCC re-orientes to take a much more focused approach to impacts via the development of the Global Goal on Adaptation and in financing for loss and damage, and as climate impacts increasingly affect globally, the EU can benefit from African expertise and knowledge in this area. A gender transformative approach should be a clear common priority and here the latest IPCC 6th Assessment Working Group II report provides clear guidance on how Gender, Climate Justice and Transformative Pathways should be approached (see Box 1).

## **Box 1: Gender, Climate Justice and Transformative Pathways**

### **Six Key Messages from the IPCC 6th Assessment Working Group II Report (Schipper et al. 2022)**

- Gender and other social inequities (e.g., racial, ethnic, age, income, geographic location) compound vulnerability to climate change impacts (high confidence).
- Addressing inequities in access to resources, assets and services, as well as participation in decision making and leadership is essential to achieving gender and climate justice (high confidence).
- Intentional long-term policy and programme measures and investments to support shifts in social rules, norms and behaviours are essential to address structural inequalities and support an enabling environment for marginalised groups to effectively adapt to climate change (very high confidence)
- Climate adaptation actions are grounded in local realities so understanding links with Sustainable Development Goal (SDG) 5 is important to ensure that adaptive actions do not worsen existing gender and other inequities within society (e.g., leading to maladaptation practices) (high confidence).
- Adaptation actions do not automatically have positive outcomes for gender equality. Understanding the positive and negative links of adaptation actions with gender equality goals, (i.e., SDG 5), is important to ensure that adaptive actions do not exacerbate existing gender-based and other social inequalities. (high confidence).
- There are very few examples of successful integration of gender and other social inequities in climate policies to address climate change vulnerabilities and questions of social justice (very high confidence).

# 3.

## Partnership Agreement

Joint cooperation on gender transformative action on adaptation and to address loss and damage will require centring climate finance needs assessments, as well as gender analyses, and stronger dialogue and knowledge exchange between the EU and AU. The process should embrace inclusive and participatory approaches with an intention to strengthen all actors in the Partnership towards adequate action to respond. The 6th AU-EU Summit held in February 2022 lacked sufficient attention to climate impacts and their unequal and gendered effects on vulnerable communities, nor to its interlinkages with food sovereignty, conflict, displacement and migration. The continental Global Gateway Initiatives announced by the EU lacked sign-on by the AU, indicating a misalignment in priorities. The success of the Partnership will now depend not only on EU and AU Union Commission and Member States but on the ownership and implementation by key actors on climate impacts including the African Group of Negotiators to the

UNFCCC, African Union climate initiatives and regional organizations, African local authorities and CSOs, indigenous peoples, local and frontline communities. Alongside bilateral and multilateral cooperation, dialogue with and strategic support for local level action will be a key measure for success. The European Commission's Directorate General for International Partnerships played a leading role in organizing a CSO information session ahead of the Kigali Ministerial and an Africa-Europe Week of Partnerships around the Summit including a CSO Forum, Local Authority Forum and Youth Day. The CSO Forum resulted in a joint CSO declaration distributed to all Leaders. However there was a lack of sustained or effective CSO engagement during and ahead of the negotiations (see CONCORD 2021a) and direct engagement of representatives of Indigenous Peoples was also lacking. This must be corrected in subsequent engagement and the development of a partnership mechanism to engage civil society, and engagement broadened across the EU institutions.

### Box 2: Key outcomes of the Africa-EU Partnership

#### **AU-EU Foreign Affairs Ministers' meeting, Kigali, October 2021**

- support should be given to Africa's efforts in mitigation, adaptation and disaster risk management
- such as the Africa Adaptation Initiative in recognition of the central importance of adaptation to Africa
- need to scale up finance supporting adaptation action and enhance climate resilience, and to build on the joint support provided so far to the African Group of Negotiators for follow up on the Paris Agreement.

#### **The Sixth EU-Africa Summit, February 2022 outcome declaration**

- Support to green transition including the implementation of the Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs) and National Adaptation Plans (NAPs) of African Countries under the Paris Agreement to enhance mitigation and adaptation
- protection of human rights for all, gender equality and women's empowerment in all spheres of life investing in women and youth
- take note of the contributions by the Youth, Civil Society, Local authorities and private sector...and encourage all relevant stakeholders to continue to engage towards our renewed Partnership



### **EU 'Global Gateway Investment Package' for Africa**

- Claim to mobilise EUR 150 billion over seven years
- Climate change as one of the seven priority areas. Continental Team Europe Initiatives (TEIs) on Great Green Wall, Food Systems, and Climate Resilience Initiative integrate climate adaptation and disaster risk.
- The Climate Resilience Initiative will support disaster risk reduction and climate change adaptation, enhancing disaster preparedness for effective response and to recovery, rehabilitation and reconstruction and strengthening governance to manage disaster risk including a Natural Disaster Risk Reduction programme and Climate Services Programme (data focused).

### **EU Africa CSO Forum, African Europe Week of Partnerships**

- Online CSO Forum of webinars and workshops to explore key areas and objectives of Partnership
- CSOs highlighted integrated and human rights-based approaches required across food sovereignty, health, climate and peace-building
- CSO Forum Declaration supported by African, European and diaspora CSOs Distributed online by the European Commission and to Leaders on the day of the Summit



Climate-smart soil protection and rehabilitation trials in Kenya. Credit: Georgina Smith / CIAT. [Creative commons license](#)

# 4.

## Financing the Partnership: analysis of EU multiannual indicative programmes and CSO Roadmaps

This section analyses the Global Europe Instrument – the EU budget Instrument underpinning the partnership – and its spending plans for the Sub Saharan African region and four African countries (selected for their variation in climate vulnerability and economies, and according to the expertise of the researchers). Each regional and national ‘Multiannual Indicative Programme’ (MIP) for 2021-27 was checked for proposed actions on adaptation and loss and damage and gender transformative approaches, and its alignment with countries’ climate plans. EU Delegations in partner countries are tasked with developing country roadmaps to strengthen strategic cooperation and structured dialogue with CSOs (European Commission, 2012). The relevant CSO Roadmaps were also investigated.

The EU aims to use its international and development finance to reinforce its geopolitical profile through its Global Gateway strategy, which puts a great emphasis on mobilized finance, with up to €150 billion in investments for Africa foreseen between 2021 and 2027. The Global Gateway investment package and initiatives announced at the Summit are underpinned by the EU budget’s Global Europe Instrument with a budget of €79.5 billion over 2021-27. Through the ‘Team Europe approach’ the European Commission also aims to crowd in finance, through additional contributions from EU Member States and financial institutions’ bilateral channels to flagship Team Europe Initiatives (see CONCORD 2021b), roughly three per national and regional programme, and configured at continental level in the Global Gateway Flagship initiatives. Spending of funds is guided by Multiannual Indicative Programming (MIPs) documents, developed in dialogue with national governments and other actors, which result in Annual Action Plans of funding allocations.

The Global Europe Instrument, largely made up of ODA, is governed by climate and environmental mainstreaming and a 30% climate target; gender mainstreaming and a target of 85% financing as gender responsive (5% as a principal objective); 20% human development and social inclusion. While the European Commission tracks mitigation and adaptation finance using the Rio Markers there is no target for adaptation finance, and no tracking of loss and damage. The instrument channels grants-based finance, and blended finance and a guarantee through the European Fund for Sustainable Development Plus (EFSD+) with a significant portion of the guarantee reserved for the European Investment Bank.<sup>2</sup> Finance for the EFSD+ has been significantly scaled up, and the role of mobilized finance is expected to play a significant role, despite limited evidence of mobilization rates or development effectiveness of the EFSD (European Parliament, 2020). Previous EU instruments (including the former Development Cooperation Instrument, Neighbourhood Instrument, and European Development Fund) have achieved good results in prioritizing shares of adaptation in climate finance, delivering 58% adaptation finance in 2018 (Act Alliance EU, 2021). However the increased focus on blended finance and the Team Europe approach in the new instrument could put this at risk: blended finance is not proven to deliver easily on adaptation objectives (it is harder to mobilise public and particularly private finance due to lower returns on investments), and some Team Europe actors do not have a strong approach on adaptation. This is reflected in collective EU climate finance figures (including institutions’ bilateral and multilateral flows) where adaptation stood at less than half of climate finance in 2020 (Council of the EU, 2021).

<sup>2</sup> The allocation of funds to be used for EFSD+ operations is based on the programming documents, in particular the priorities defined therein, and should take into consideration, inter alia, the specific realities and needs of each partner country or region and the relative weight of the allocation of funds per geographical area laid down in this Regulation.

#### 4.1 The multi-annual indicative programme for Sub-Saharan Africa (regional MIP)

Analysis of the MIP for Sub Saharan Africa shows that 'green transition' is a key priority area (Sub-Saharan Africa will be a geographic priority for the green transition area and for EFSD+ investments) and that climate mainstreaming should happen across sectors and priority areas. However unpacking this reveals a relatively low focus on climate impacts.

Five fields of Green Transition and their relative funding allocations are set out in Table 1. The MIP uses the concept 'climate resilience,' referring to adaptation and disaster risk, and does not articulate the issue of loss and damage in its context analysis (droughts and floods' impacts on livelihoods of vulnerable communities seems to be a particular omission).

Table 1: Funding allocations to six priority areas in the Sub-Saharan African Regional MIP 2021-27, and five sub-fields of 'Green Transition' priority area. Table adapted from Sub Saharan African Regional MIP 'Financial Overview' pg 54.

Priority Areas	Million EUR	% of total programme
Priority Area 1 – Human Development	880	8.6%
Priority area 2 – Democratic Governance, Peace and Security, Culture	855	8.3%
Priority Area 3 Green Transition	2100	20.5%
Climate Mitigation and Resilience	300	2.9
Sustainable Energy	570	5.6
Sustainable Agri-food Systems	470	4.6
Biodiversity and Environment	400	3.9
Water and Oceans	360	3.5
Priority area 4 – Digital & Science, Technology & Innovation	1240	12.1%
Priority area 5 – Sustainable Growth and Decent Jobs	1830	17.9%
Priority area 6 – Migration and Forced Displacement	1600	15.6%
EFSD+ (technical assistance @ 250MIL)	1450	14.2%
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>10242</b>	<b>100%</b>



Climate impacts are addressed predominantly through sub-field 'climate mitigation and resilience,' which includes actions to support climate diplomacy and policy frameworks across mitigation, adaptation and resilience. For the 'resilience' element, only part of this sub-field alongside mitigation, expected results span the spectrum of adaptation, disaster risk reduction, and reducing and addressing loss and damage, through building adaptive and DRM capacities, improving data collection and analyses on climate and early warning systems (EWS) and scaling up climate and disaster risk financing including InsuResilience Global Partnership (IGP) and the African Risk Capacity. Support to the development of regional risk pooling mechanisms is specifically highlighted as well as work with the private sector on effective weather and disaster risk insurance solutions and markets. The 2022 Annual Action Plan includes three components for the climate mitigation and resilience field: €80 million to deliver in part on the European Commission's pledge at COP26 to the UNFCCC Adaptation Fund, €6 million to the Global Covenant of Mayors, and €13 million to the Great Green Wall TEI.

'Sustainable Agri-food Systems', 'Water and Oceans' 'Biodiversity and Environment' (through NaturAfrica and the Great Green Wall) are the other main areas where adaptation is addressed in the green transition priority area. For example climate shocks and entry points for adaptation are highlighted in agri-food systems, and testing and scaling innovation on agroecology. However the intersection with DRM and loss and damage is not explored.

From planned budget allocations to different priority areas (see table 1) the total finance for climate and environment is not clear, nor are the splits between climate mitigation and adaptation. A more predominant focus seems definitely to be put in mitigation (sustainable energy with the highest share, and mitigation being mixed with the resilience objective). But it is clear that a significant portion of action on adaptation must be reached through further mainstreaming. The MIP's stated intention is also to mainstream climate and explore interlinkages with other priority areas. This appears

rather limited in the MIP, including climate sensitive analysis in Governance Peace and Security; use of new technologies and Earth Observation data to monitor climate impacts in Digital, Science, Technology and Innovation; support to green transition in Sustainable jobs and decent growth and macro-economic support to sectoral reform.

#### **4.2 Multiannual indicative plans, CSO Roadmaps and climate plans at national level: Zimbabwe, Somalia, South Sudan, and the Gambia**

Country ownership and coordination of climate financing is important to ensure effectiveness. Looking at the alignment of MIPs with national climate plans and development priorities, and in the case of the Sub Saharan African MIP to the African Union's climate strategy, can offer insights into how well the EU is supporting country priorities. Table 2 presents an overview of inclusion of adaptation and loss and damage in both climate plans and MIPs, as well as relevant Team Europe Initiatives which show where the EU is prioritizing coordination of climate and development finance with different EU actors and institutions.

Table 2: Adaptation and Loss and Damage in NDCs and NAPs (where available), MIPs, and Team Europe Initiatives

Region/ Country	Regional strategies or Nationally Determined Contribution (NDC)	Multiannual Indicative Programme	Team Europe Initiatives
<b>Sub Saharan Africa</b>  <i>* The AU Draft CC Strategy 2020-30 is assessed in place of an NDC</i>	<i>Adaptation: context or needs assessment &amp; response</i>		
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Response: focus on on adaptation, disaster risk reduction (DRR), continental early-warning system, regional climate centres; African Adaptation Initiative</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Support to regional policy frameworks and initiatives</li> <li>Cross-sectoral mainstreaming including in agri-food, biodiversity, water</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Trans-boundary water management</li> <li>NaturAfrica</li> <li>Continental Climate Resilience Initiative</li> </ul>
	<i>Loss and damage: context or needs assessment &amp; response</i>		
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Responses: focus on reducing loss and damage; African Risk Capacity</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Support to disaster risk financing; e.g. African Risk Capacity and Insuresilience</li> <li>Support to development of public regional risk pooling insurance solutions</li> <li>Support to private sector development of insurance solutions</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Continental Global Gateway Climate Resilience Initiative: <i>support to recovery, rehabilitation and reconstruction</i></li> </ul>
<b>Zimbabwe</b>  <i>Sources: <a href="#">NDC</a> <a href="#">MIP</a></i>	<i>Adaptation: context or needs assessment &amp; response</i>		
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Assessment: climate vulnerability assessment includes gender and intersectionality component; key sectors assessed are smart agriculture, water, infrastructure</li> <li>Reponses: climate resilient agriculture and food supply chains, climate resilient infrastructure and design, water resources management, enhancing early warning and information systems</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Focus on climate smart agriculture but adaptation efforts not detailed</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Climate smart agriculture-based resilience building</li> <li>Gender equality &amp; women's empowerment – cross-sectoral initiative</li> </ul>
	<i>Loss and damage: context or needs assessment &amp; response</i>		
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Assessment: climate vulnerability assessment identifies losses in livelihoods, capital, and across sectors</li> </ul>	X	X
<b>Somalia</b>  <i>Sources: <a href="#">NDC</a> <a href="#">MIP</a></i>	<i>Adaptation: context or needs assessment &amp; response</i>		
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Assessment and response: identified priority sectors are agriculture and food security; water resources management and public health; DRM; coastal, marine environment and fisheries; energy, forestry and environment; human settlement; and infrastructure including roads and bridges</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Include adaptation in sustainable agri-food systems, investments in agri-business and infrastructure</li> <li>multi-sectoral approach to climate and environmental resilience, includes a focus on vulnerable communities and a major focus on displacement</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Climate Action through Clean Energy Initiatives and climate-resilient economy (Somalia's National Adaptation Programme among multiple focus areas)</li> </ul>
	<i>Loss and damage: context or needs assessment &amp; response</i>		
	X	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Context analysis refers to humanitarian assistance needs, problem of displacement</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Resilience building and social inclusion: integrated responses to climate impacts, social inclusion and displacement; shock responsive social protection measures</li> </ul>

Region/ Country	Regional strategies or Nationally Determined Contribution (NDC)	Multiannual Indicative Programme	Team Europe Initiatives
<b>South Sudan</b>  Sources: <a href="#">National Adaption Plan</a> <a href="#">NDC</a> <a href="#">MIP</a>	<i>Adaptation: context or needs assessment &amp; response</i>		
	Comprehensive national adaptation plan: • Needs assessment: climate science and socio-economic vulnerability assessment; identification of adaptation finance needs • Response: adaptation mainstreaming roadmap for integration into planning and budgeting at national, state and local levels; financing; and stakeholder engagement. Gender-sensitive and equitable approaches to building resilience. • Prioritises agriculture, livestock and fisheries; disaster risk reduction; energy; environment; ecosystems and biodiversity conservation; health; human settlements; tourism and recreation; industry, infrastructure and transportation; water resources	• Assessment: climate change shocks (e.g. flooding, drought, locust) recognized as main risk alongside conflict to all priorities, with particular effect on food security • Response: Green and resilient economy identified as one of three priority areas; encompassing food security, jobs for youth, diversification of the economy, climate change. Focus on agriculture and rural development, particularly in marginalised regions with vulnerable groups, including internally displaced people (IDP), refugees and returnees. All interventions will be embedded in sustainable management of natural resources (water, land, forests).	X
	<i>Loss and damage: context or needs assessment &amp; response</i>		
	• Assessment: limited assessment of negative socio-economic impacts e.g. increased crop losses, loss of pasture lands and water resources for livestock, reduction of critical habitats for biodiversity in wetlands and forests, reduction in river flows and adverse impacts on key habitats in wetland ecosystems and estimate of GDP loss.	X	X
<b>Gambia</b>  Sources: <a href="#">NDC</a> <a href="#">MIP</a>	<i>Adaptation: context or needs assessment &amp; response</i>		
	• Integrated approach to adaptation across all vulnerable economic sectors • Gambia's Strategic Programme for Climate Resilience (2017) and the National Disaster Risk Reduction Plan 2019-2030, • Indicative adaptation costs for key sectors over 25 years, new and additional finance	• Climate mainstreaming into the national development process, climate change adaptation and disaster management in key sectoral policies agriculture and natural resources, forest and fisheries	• Green Gambia: tourism and food systems
	<i>Loss and damage: context or needs assessment &amp; response</i>		
	• Financing strategy refers to need for global disaster relief and disaster insurance facilities to manage climate disasters, including insurance premiums with a grant component	X	X

The MIPs' context analyses include geographic, economic and social vulnerability to climate impacts, and proposed actions to mainstream and provide dedicated support to adaptation, disaster risk reduction and biodiversity. MIPs seem to align relatively well with adaptation objectives of national or regional climate plans and strategies, and there are a high prevalence of TEIs incorporating green transition or green deal objectives which is indicative of the urgent needs for climate and biodiversity finance. This is also reflected in other regional and country programmes, where 72.7% of TEIs incorporate (see Capacity4Dev [no date]). Without further details on the TEIs it is difficult to assess them, but in some cases they seem rather detached, with European Green Deal language extrapolated to TEIs and not enough effort to contextualize on the countries' needs, particularly

on climate impacts. Overall a focus on loss and damage is lacking or not explicit, both in national plans and strategies and MIPs. If MIPs focus on loss and damage it is predominantly via disaster risk financing.

EU delegations manage the coordination of projects and programmes and have developed CSO Roadmaps to guide cooperation and structured dialogue of EU and member states with Civil Society organizations at partner country level (European Commission, 2021). CSO Roadmaps can be updated by the initiative of EU delegations at any time, but were obligated to be updated for 2020. Table 3 sets out the status of CSO roadmaps for four African countries with respect to inclusion of CSO work and engagement relevant to gender and climate, and whether they are up to date.

**Table 3: Information on CSO Roadmaps, detailing inclusion of climate and gender as a priority (green), limited inclusion (orange) or not included (red)**

	<b>Zimbabwe 2018-2020</b>	<b>Somalia 2021-25</b>	<b>South Sudan 2016-20</b>	<b>Gambia 2021-23</b>
Updated	X	✓	X	✓
Climate	○	○	X	✓
Gender	○	○	X	✓

Source: All CSO Roadmaps can be found at <https://europa.eu/capacity4dev/public-governance-civilsociety/wiki/roadmaps>





# 5.

## Key Takeaways: financing and partnership

### Mainstreaming adaptation

Context analyses and overarching priorities outlined in the MIPs indicate efforts to mainstream climate and biodiversity, predominantly through the priority green transition areas where climate adaptation efforts are already normally targeted. This includes green economy, climate-resilient agriculture, nature restoration and management, sustainable environmental management; water resources management. It is positive that approaches which protect and restore nature appear to be prioritised in many cases. There are also good indications of efforts to increase resilience in agriculture, and South Sudan's focus on climate resilience and women's economic empowerment stands out. This now requires a much clearer consideration of adaptation components of resilience building, and needs to be strengthened through a proper assessment of climate vulnerability: this would indicate that building adaptive capacity is not enough, and that response measures in the event of crop loss. Adaptation also appears to be integrated in some other areas, for example building resilience and social inclusion, or digital sectors for example. However there is often no or insufficiently indicated adaptation mainstreaming in key areas including displacement, in conflict (for example the Somali conflict TEI), and in some agri-food action areas including pastoralism. Effectiveness of climate and environmental mainstreaming across sectors is already a documented concern in geographic (national and regional) level programmes in the previous budget (European Parliament, 2020). As the geographic programmes receive the bulk of the funding in the Global Europe Instrument, the EU and EU delegations need to take a significant step-up in engagement and technical assistance on adaptation mainstreaming with partner governments and beneficiaries.

### Addressing loss and damage: needs and responses

MIPs lack assessment of climate-induced losses and damages, which are referred to only indirectly and in limited instances as displacement or humanitarian needs. MIPs largely focused on

actions to avert, minimize and reduce loss and damage and DRM approaches. More support to DRM is essential, but this also leaves gaps, including because DRM tends to focus on rapid onset weather events, leaving slower onset events like sea level rise or salinization lacking action. Of the reviewed financing plans only the Sub Saharan African MIP and the Somali MIP includes some actions which could fall into the category of addressing loss and damage, through exploring finance to disaster or climate risk insurance initiatives (for example Insuresilience and the Africa Risk Capacity) and a social protection scheme. The Global Gateway Climate Resilience Initiative proposes support to recovery, rehabilitation and reconstruction, but it is not yet clear how this will be financed and put into action. Given inherent limitations in insurance to address climate-induced loss and damage (including risks to exclude women, worsen inequalities and limitations around coverage for types of extreme weather events) and action to address loss and damage needs to be broader than only based on insurance initiatives (OI, 2018) and support to social protection measures should be prioritised.

### Gender transformative approach

Multiple NDCs include national gender plans, gender equality indicators and actions, or will to work on identified gaps. The MIPs show commitments to advancing gender equality through mainstreaming, at strategic and operational level, and to advance a more intersectional approach; the Somali MIP Resilience priority area stands out for its intersectional focus on gender and other inequalities. In light of the EU GAP III a more explicit gender and intersectionality focus would be expected in all areas. In most MIPs analysis of climate impacts and gender is very limited, particularly at strategic level when considering the role of women and girls in different sectors (particularly in agriculture), or which modalities of finance to use. Operationalizing a gender transformative approach will require stronger consideration of gender equality at all levels of

the programming and financing cycle, including stronger analysis of climate impacts and affected sectors, access to finance and finance modalities. Financing for organisations led by or representing women and girls or efforts to strengthen women and girls' participation in decision making is also key.

### **Localisation**

Responses to climate impacts need to be grounded in local realities. It is good that local level action is highlighted by the national level MIPs, but further work is needed to identify preconditions and enablers for building capacities for locally led initiatives to enable vulnerable communities to realize tangible benefits from the MIP and other climate action funds. The indicated focus on large scale projects in some MIPs could represent an opportunity cost on support to smaller scale infrastructures and locally led adaptation projects. DRM mechanisms are being largely focused at regional and private initiatives rather than at supporting localization. Thinking nationally but acting locally would help to tailor interventions to the local circumstances.

### **Financing allocations**

The Global Europe instrument apportions climate finance from EU ODA, whereas NDCs' identified finance needs show that access to new, additional and sustained sources of climate finance is needed to deal with climate impacts, as expressed in identified adaptation finance needs in the South Sudan, Somali and Gambian NDC. The high prevalence of 'green transition' as a priority in African MIPs is a further indication of financing needs, but this term often indicates a focus on mitigation and in itself denotes a European bias on the current challenges and priorities to be addressed. Besides lacking new and additional climate finance to respond to needs, the MIPs lack clarity about planned allocations of climate finance, and shares of mitigation, adaptation and loss and damage. While in the previous period of the EU budget 2014-2020 EU budget funds and the European Development Fund achieved high levels of adaptation finance (for example 58% of climate finance was for adaptation in 2018 – see Act Alliance EU, 2018), it is not clear from the MIPs that this will be maintained. In addition the Global Europe

Instrument has a greater proportion of finance going through the EFSD+ where there are low mobilization potentials for adaptation investments as compared to mitigation. Sovereign and sub-sovereign lending aggravate the debt burden of countries and regions that are currently highly constrained by debt. Clear ex ante commitments on adaptation finance and information about projected climate finance can help countries better plan their own interventions and identify gaps.

### **Financing modalities**

Effectively addressing adaptation and loss and damage will require the bulk of finance in the form of grants. The MIPs do not propose a detailed breakdown of funding modalities, but propose to explore use of blended finance and sovereign, sub-sovereign and private sector guarantees and in some instances public-private partnerships in green priority areas, and other priority areas where climate objectives should be mainstreamed. If beneficiaries of blended finance are obligated to undertake climate vulnerability assessments and adaptation measures, accompanied by technical assistance from the EU, this can offer an opportunity to better support public and private sectors to build up resilience. However use of blended finance and guarantees requires careful consideration because these modalities risk reinforcing gender inequalities (through barriers in access to finance, lack of focus on localization), and increasing the debt burden on developing countries, which undermines overall gender and adaptation objectives. Incentivising private ownership of public services and the logic of private sector efficiency also represents a risk to public environmental policy objectives (EURODAD & EPSU, 2020).

### **Access to finance**

While the MIPs show strong commitments to the role of CSOs, they do not indicate how CSOs will be enabled to access the grants modality most likely to be used by CSOs, including women's organisations, smaller CSOs and grassroots groups. Similarly with regard to end beneficiaries of actions, the MIPs do not adequately explore how modalities of finance will be suited to end beneficiaries' needs, or made more accessible, to women small scale farmers for example.

### CSOs consultation and engagement

EU delegations in partner countries were obligated to carry out consultation processes on all the MIPs, however CSO monitoring has shown gaps and inconsistencies in consultation with CSOs and local communities. CSOs are specifically mentioned in EU budget programming documents as the frontline organisations for communities at sub-national, national, regional and AU-EU levels, playing a major role in delivery and framing strategic orientations and definition of programmes in the 'green transition', and this requires "empowering civil society in their management capacity [and] advocacy role." MIPs indicate support to CSO multi-country networks and platforms and local authorities' associations, and local CSOs in climate and environmental action and to strengthen youth and women's participation, including in NDCs and climate change adaptation initiatives. In the previous budget period small and locally based CSOs have felt left out in planned

interventions, with a focus on financing large institutions, and when it comes to CSOs large and European CSOs, and have highlighted laborious processes to access finance.

To address this CSO Roadmaps must be EU delegations' key tools for engagement on actions and in reviews of financing. However some CSO roadmaps are outdated, and there are limited references to CSOs engaged in the ecosystem of areas relevant to climate action including human rights, women's rights and environmental defenders. The CSO Road Maps reviewed point to the need to strengthen capacity of CSOs to engage across the different levels- grassroot community, sub-national and national levels in general. CSO Roadmaps which are not up to date and do not yet have an explicit focus on climate and gender equality must be corrected to enable effective engagement with and funding for CSOs.



Pastoralists living in the Ewaso Ng'iro river basin in central Kenya are digging for water and fear they will have to begin large-scale cattle destocking. Credit: Denis Onyodi / Denis Onyodi/KRC. [Creative commons license](#)



## Key Recommendations

### 6.1 Partnership recommendations for the EU and the AU

Work to transcend the traditional colonial and post-colonial framework hampering relations. This means greater **respect for African priorities and expertise, indigenous and traditional knowledge on climate impacts; support for African ownership at multiple levels** of the partnership and in financing including the AU, African Group of Negotiators (AGN), Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), African regional initiatives and organisations, African CSOs, women's rights organisations, indigenous peoples and frontline communities. Joint work is needed to bring more attention towards adaptation and addressing loss and damage, and to build common understandings of key concepts including adaptation needs and adaptive capacity, addressing loss and damage, agroecological action, and the intersection of climate with displacement, conflict and peacebuilding.

Advance **multilateral cooperation and implementation on climate impacts** by:

- Scaling up the ambition of the EU's nationally determined contribution in order to reduce climate impacts; the EU can use the revision of climate and energy legislation to increase emissions reductions targets (see Climate Analytics, 2022)
- Recognizing the demands of African parties and communities, capture progress from the Glasgow Dialogues and support the decision to **set up a Loss and Damage financing facility under the UNFCCC and Paris Agreement**, resourced with finance in the form of grants, with direct access modalities, to be released at speed and scale for communities affected by climate change and extreme weather (CAN International et al. 2022).
- Providing clear prospects for increasing new and additional public finance for adaptation to match Africa's particular needs and asks, building on European Commission and EU Member States' progress in adaptation finance, taking into account the COP26 commitment to at least double adaptation finance by 2025, and make a key contribution to operationalize the Global Goal on Adaptation

- Working towards an ambitious, equitable and rights-based Post-2020 Global Biodiversity Framework which builds synergies with climate objectives, whereby protecting and restoring nature forms a core part of adaptation action.

Strengthen the channels through which the EU and AU institutions and the African Group of Negotiators work on **strategic areas of implementation and climate diplomacy** through sharing knowledge and co-development, and to further develop the Global Gateway Climate Resilience Initiative announced at the Partnership Summit by the EU, in particular:

- Exploring key sectors and areas where a more integrated approach and stronger climate vulnerability mainstreaming is needed including agriculture and food systems, water, conflict and peacebuilding, displacement, climate-related disaster preparedness
- Explore how climate change is altering the nature of humanitarian crises, and how response needs to change to deal with the resulting loss and damage
- Supporting increased participation by women, minority genders, marginalized groups in decision-making on climate resilience and use gender analysis to assess preparedness to address climate shocks, in terms of capacity, skills, technology and funding in African led initiatives
- Key EU Member States with greater capacity to explore loss and damage financing should take a lead with the European Commission, the African Union Commission and key African Union Member States to explore how to better address loss and damage through the partnership including models to address issues of loss and damage from a gender and intersectionality perspective; and to go beyond support to early warning systems and existing insurance-based approaches, and centralized approaches, to more accessible financing, which contributes to longer term reconstruction and rehabilitation
- Ensure further support and technical assistance to the development of National Adaptation Plans, and support and technical assistance for the inclusion of loss and damage in NDCs (WWF, 2020).



Set up a **Civil Society and Indigenous Peoples Partnership Mechanism** to support engagement of African Indigenous Peoples, African and European CSOs in the full policy cycle and well in advance of key international moments including UNFCCC negotiations; this should facilitate the participation of a diverse group of civil society actors and a balanced representation of civil society from all regions involved, including the EU, to enable sharing knowledge and experience on climate change adaptation and loss and damage, and to contribute to Continental Global Gateway Initiatives. Financial and technical support is a key enabler for meaningful participation.

Share timely and transparent information on Global Gateway and national Team Europe Initiatives' development and how they contribute to partnership objectives. As climate impacts initiatives are context specific, there is need to ensure that the TEI drive for collective impact and visibility does not disadvantage or exclude small locally led CSO initiatives in vulnerable communities.

EU delegations should be better capacitated to deal with climate mainstreaming, the intersections with development gender equality, and key areas including biodiversity, food sovereignty and peacebuilding to **improve engagement from local to national level** in African countries; CSO Roadmaps should be updated with climate and gender where necessary. CSOs should be supported to document experience and lessons in what works, to take solutions to support vulnerable communities to scale. CSOs should also be supported in accessing financial resources (climate and L&D finance).

## 6.2 Financing recommendations for the EU

The EU should **urgently scale-up new and additional climate finance in line with its fair share** to deliver on the Paris Agreement's \$100 billion commitment over 2020-25, making up shortfalls for failure to deliver in early years of the obligation; and **collectively deliver at least 50% adaptation finance with a focus on scaling up grants** from existing budgets. The EU should also provide **new and additional grants-based finance to address loss and damage**. To support the UNFCCC's New Collective Quantified Goal on climate finance, the EU should commit to scaling up mitigation, adaptation and loss and damage finance commensurate with needs and equity, focusing on most affected countries and communities, and allocate new and additional finance to climate finance by using partial allocations of redirected fossil fuel subsidies, levies on fossil fuel companies' profits and revenues from taxation on pollution. Revenues from the new Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism should be channeled to UNFCCC funds or to establish a new fund under EU budget Heading VI, and Member States should allocate an increased share of EU Emissions Trading System revenues to international climate finance.

The European Commission and EU Member States from the [Adaptation Champions Group](#) should take a lead in ensuring **adaptation finance is increased to African countries and regions**, with a focus on improving access to finance, following the [Principles of Locally Led Adaptation](#), and strengthening community and institutional capacity on climate vulnerability assessments and responses which combine local, indigenous knowledge and science. EU budget contributions should build on previous adaptation finance achievements and target 60% climate finance as adaptation in African countries through EU budget contributions. The EU can also build on the successful replenishment of the UNFCCC Adaptation Fund with further contributions, while focusing strongly on improving its governance and accessibility for national and local CSOs, especially women-led or WROs, youth orgs.

All climate impacts projects and programmes should take a **gender transformative and intersectional approach** and financing should be 100% gender responsive; the focus should be on the most disadvantaged women and minority genders, indigenous peoples and persons belonging to racial/ethnic/religious minorities, forcibly displaced, economically and socially deprived, and those living in rural and areas. Scale up efforts to strengthen access of women and their organizations to climate finance, including capacity building and strengthen participation in climate governance (policies, climate finance, projects). As well as gender mainstreaming at project level, strategically align programming and financing modalities at macro-level to gender transformative outcomes, informed by intersectional gender analyses of financing modalities and climate impact assessments across sectors. The EU's Global Gateway's focus on large scale infrastructure and 'bankable' projects should not be at the expense of local infrastructure and initiatives supporting women's livelihoods with clear poverty reduction and gender equality objectives. Analyse gender and social inclusion in impact assessments of climate finance, by supporting frameworks, monitoring, evaluation and learning systems, particularly in the smallholder agriculture sector and natural resources-based livelihoods.

**Improve transparency** by tracking adaptation and loss and damage finance, and use an ex ante approach to plan adaptation finance increases in annual EU budget and Global Europe Instrument reporting. This should also support greater transparency in reporting of projects finance to the UNFCCC (Article 9.5 reports). Transparency to local stakeholders should also be improved via clearer information provision by EU delegations.

In order to deliver on the Climate Resilience Initiative's proposal to support recovery, rehabilitation and reconstruction, **explore further support to address loss and damage** through regional and national climate risk facilities, prioritising support to contingency funds, social protection schemes, and assorted national loss and damage mechanisms as they develop. Subsidising insurance-based approaches can form one part of the solution, the focus should be on improving accessibility and supporting the most vulnerable

following the SMART principles developed under and endorsed in the InsuResilience Global Partnership.

The **focus on finance for adaptation and loss and damage should be on grants**. Additionally the EFSD+ can play a role in enhancing adaptive capacity across sectors. Adaptation and climate risk should be a strong focus of sustainable finance programmes. Climate risk assessments and action plans to address climate impacts should be required by beneficiaries of blended finance, accompanied by technical assistance particularly for smaller actors accessing blended finance. Beneficiaries of blended finance should also be held to account for due diligence, free prior and informed consent, and social accountability and redress mechanisms for communities. Given the EIB, EBRD and other European development banks remain heavily mitigation focused the EFSD+ guarantee should be used to incentivize adaptation-proof investments.

Financing from the European Commission is difficult to access for many African and smaller organisations because of procedural requirements. **Improving access to finance to CSOs, women's organisations and grassroots** groups can support transformative outcomes for groups working to challenge gender norms and correct power imbalances, for example by earmarking funding for direct access to local NGOs, with leaner procedural requirements.

Build on learnings from other climate finance initiatives (including the EU Global Climate Change Alliance Plus and the AfDB African Climate Change Fund) to **mainstream climate action** more effectively and increase co-benefits for poverty reduction, gender equality, food sovereignty, biodiversity and health. This can be strengthened in sectors where integrated action is already happening: prioritizing climate approaches which protect and restore biodiversity, in agriculture and food systems (by shifting more agriculture budgets into agroecology and improving climate mainstreaming), in water and land resources management. But also move into sectors/areas where integration with climate action is very limited, including migration and forced

displacement (building adaptive capacity to enable choice and addressing loss and damage), conflict and peace-building, and in Education and Skills with special attention to training and skills development of youth. **Climate risk assessments tools and response measures should be strengthened and broadened** in scope to include **estimated losses and damages** and action plans to address them for projects and programmes. Climate risk assessments should also be adapted for use both in infrastructure at project level and across all sectors and priority areas. The intersection between climate risk and conflict also needs strengthening: in designing climate adaptation initiatives conflict risks should be assessed (especially in fragile contexts) and proactive steps taken to monitor for and mitigate against causing harm. Programming should conflict-sensitive, to avoid conflict triggers and contribute to sustaining and building peace.



Solar wells to address the problem of drought, women's cooperative uses solar energy in Mauritania. Credit: Raphael Pouget / Climate Visuals Countdown. [Creative commons license](#)

# Glossary of key definitions

**Adaptive capacity to climate impacts:** The ability of a system to adjust to climate change (including climate variability and extremes) in order to moderate potential damages, to take advantage of opportunities or to cope with the consequences. Adaptive capacity is a necessary condition for the design and implementation of effective adaptation strategies and enables sectors and institutions to take advantage of opportunities or benefits from climate change.

**Climate change adaptation:** an adjustment in natural or human systems in response to actual or expected climatic stimuli or their effects, which moderates harm or exploits beneficial opportunities. There are several kinds of adaptation: anticipatory, reactive, private, public, autonomous and planned.

**Climate justice:** a climate justice approach takes account of historical responsibility for climate change, which predominantly lies with wealthy and powerful countries and people, and its disproportionate impacts on the poorest and most vulnerable. This manifests in unequal distribution of impacts on a variety of groups, including Indigenous people, people of colour, women and disabled people. Addressing inequities and power imbalances, as well as providing financial and other forms of support for climate action for poor and oppressed countries and communities is key to climate justice.

**New and additional climate finance:** Article 4.3 of the UNFCCC convention, which sets out climate finance obligations of developed to developing countries, specifies that climate finance should be 'new and additional.' CSOs and many developing country parties believe provision of climate finance should be additional to official development assistance and aid commitments, which means that funds reported towards meeting UNFCCC obligations should not be reported towards meeting the commitment to give 0.7 percent of Gross National Income (GNI) as aid. However there is no internationally agreed definition of "new and additional." It has become common practice to merge climate finance with development aid (ODA) budgets at the European Commission and among EU Member States.

**Disaster Risk Reduction (DRR):** The Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction (SFDRR) provides broad and overarching guidance for reducing all disaster risk and losses in lives, livelihoods and health as well as in the cultural, economic, environmental, physical and social assets of people, businesses, communities and countries. In the context of reducing climate-related loss and damage, the SFDRR recognises the primacy of the UNFCCC. Disaster Risk Management (DRM) and DRR governance and frameworks are much broader in scope than climate-related loss and damage, as not all disasters and related DRM approaches are climate-related. DRM includes risk reduction efforts, such as early warning systems, emergency preparedness, including retrofitting houses and public infrastructure; and plays a critical role in addressing loss and damage through response and recovery efforts.

**Humanitarian Assistance:** is designed to help people at risk or already in dire need as a result of natural disasters, epidemics or conflict. It includes immediate emergency assistance in the wake of sudden disasters; ongoing emergency assistance in protracted crisis situations; transitional humanitarian assistance over the medium term linking short-term emergency measures and long-term development cooperation. Humanitarian aid is an immediate response to a disaster. It is a reaction triggered by a shock and is short lived addressing a situational specific need.

**Loss and damage:** results from impacts of climate change which are not avoided by mitigation, adaptation or other measures such as disaster risk management. It has both economic and non-economic costs and results from both extreme weather events like hurricanes and floods and slow onset climatic processes such as sea level rise, glacial retreat and salinization. Loss and damage include permanent and irreversible losses such as to lives, livelihoods, homes and territory, for which an economic value can be calculated and also to non-economic impacts, such as the loss of culture, identity, ecosystem services and biodiversity, which cannot be quantified in monetary terms (adapted from Heinrich Boell, 2021). The Paris Agreement's long-term goals revolve around mitigation, adaptation and in Article 8 it recognises the importance of averting, minimising and addressing loss and damage distinct from adaptation.



**Warsaw International Mechanism:** International dialogue and cooperation on loss and damage happens mainly through the UNFCCC Warsaw International Mechanism, created at [COP19](#) in 2013 as the UNFCCC's loss and damage mechanism to promote implementation of approaches to address loss and damage associated with the adverse effects of climate change.

**The Santiago Network on loss and damage:** was created at COP25 in 2019 to further the work of the mechanism by catalyzing access to, and organizing the availability of, technical assistance to developing countries vulnerable to the adverse impacts of climate change.

**Gender Equality:** is defined as upholding human rights and the absence of discrimination in assigning responsibility and opportunities based on a person's sex in the allocation of resources and benefits, or access to services.

**Gender Equity:** An approach where measures are put in place to compensate for the historical and social disadvantages that prevent women and men from operating on a level playing field

**Gender Justice:** The systemic redistribution of power, opportunities, and access for people of all genders through the dismantling of harmful structures barriers that leads to inequality. It signifies an intersectional approach that centers the needs, experiences, and leadership of people most impacted by discrimination and oppression.

**Gender Mainstreaming:** is a process of assessing the implications for women and men of any planned action, including legislation, policies/programmes, in all areas and at levels. It is the current international approach for making women's and men's concerns and experiences an integral dimension for the design, implementation, monitoring and evaluation of policies and programmes in all political, economic and social spheres so that women and men benefit equally and inequality is not perpetuated (UN ECOSOC, 1997). Mainstreaming gender into all sectors will eliminate all negative economic, social and cultural practices that impede equality and equity of the sexes, which is informed by a gender analysis process.

**Gender transformative approach:** (in relation to climate change impacts) a holistic approach that focuses on the economic, political, ecological and cultural causes of vulnerability of different groups, aiming to address the roots of vulnerability through actions that challenge the fundamental attributes of a system in response to climate and its effects. Guiding principles should include context awareness, equal access to and control over resources and assets, recognizing and addressing time spent in care work and domestic work, investing in social protection and services, and enabling spaces for discussion, collaboration, participation and decision-making (adapted from SEI, 2021).

**Food sovereignty:** The right of peoples to define their own food and agriculture; to protect and regulate domestic agricultural production and trade in order to achieve sustainable development objectives; to determine the extent to which they want to be self-reliant; to restrict the dumping of products in their markets. Food sovereignty does not negate trade, but rather it promotes the formulation of trade policies and practices that serve the rights of peoples to food and to safe, healthy and ecologically sustainable production (adapted from IIED, 2008).

**Social Inclusion:** Extends the definition of marginalized groups to include youth, people with disabilities (PWDs), extremely poor households often with elderly or terminally ill people, or low-income female or child-headed households. Social inclusion also refers to the development of inclusive institutions including financing, employment, energy policies and behaviours that provide an opportunity for previously marginalized groups to increase their voice and access to assets and opportunities. Other context-specific situations include refugees and internally displaced populations may be categorized as vulnerable groups

**Intersectionality:** The interaction between gender, race and other categories of difference in individual lives, social practices, institutional arrangements, and cultural ideologies and the outcomes of these in terms of power.

**LGBTQI people:** Lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, queer and intersex (LGBTQI) persons face specific obstacles when it comes to accessing many of their rights, including their right to social protection. They are uniquely vulnerable to exclusion, violence and exploitation because of the cumulative impacts of social stigma, discrimination and hatred.

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