



Towards a Feminist Foreign Climate Policy: considerations for the EU

Climate Action Network (CAN) Europe is Europe's leading NGO coalition fighting dangerous climate change. With over 185 member organisations active in 38 European countries, representing over 1,700 NGOs and more than 40 million citizens, CAN Europe promotes sustainable climate, energy and development policies throughout Europe.

Executive summary

The climate crisis, its impacts and the actions needed to rapidly slow it down and respond to it effectively require an intersectional and gender-responsive lens. The most recent 6th Assessment Report by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) has given strong attention to equitable, just and enabling ways to address mitigation and adaptation. This is based on the reality that structural inequities and unequal power relationships are key reasons why the climate crisis is particularly harmful for already marginalised groups and people in all their diversity. Europe, and the EU in particular, must step up towards human-rights based climate action efforts in an effective, participatory and inclusive way ensuring social and climate justice. This requires an intersectional, decolonial, anti-racist and gender-transformative approach to dismantle the roots of injustice and inequality, breaking down existing power relations between all genders as well as in other contexts.

This paper connects the EU's external climate policy efforts with emerging developments and debates under a feminist foreign policy discourse, including examples of how the latter integrate climate action. It looks into key building blocks and entry points for enhancing feminist perspectives and principles in EU's climate foreign policy.

However, it is also based on the conviction that a truly feminist foreign policy cannot succeed without fully embedding aspects and actions central to global climate justice, given the fundamental challenges the climate crisis poses and how it interlinks with the multiple other crises mentioned before.

Eventually it concludes with more specific, detailed recommendations contributing to the following seven overarching recommendations.

1. **Clear political commitments and accountability frameworks for a feminist approach to climate diplomacy;**
2. **Deliver on international climate finance commitments with a strengthened gender lens;**
3. **Increase active and significant participation of women and marginalised groups in all their diversity in decision-making in the climate diplomacy context;**
4. **Strengthen feminist, gender and social inclusion aspects in EU specific finance instruments;**
5. **Re-orient the Global Gateway strategy with a strengthened feminist policy analysis;**
6. **Commit to feminist aspects in the European External Action Service**
7. **Implement feminist aspects in monitoring and data collection**

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1. Introduction

The climate crisis, its impacts and the actions that are needed to rapidly slow it down and respond to it effectively require an intersectional, gender-responsive lens. The most recent [6th Assessment Report by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change](#) (IPCC) has given strong attention to equitable, just and enabling ways to address mitigation and adaptation. This is based on the reality that structural inequities and unequal power relationships are key reasons why the climate crisis is particularly harmful for already marginalised segments of the populations in all their diversity, while these structural imbalances are also an underlying cause for the climate crisis. Gender inequality is frequently mentioned as one of those inequities that need to be addressed to advance climate resilient pathways. As the climate crisis continues to unfold, with record heat waves hitting Europe as well as many other parts in the world in 2022 and 2023, with global CO₂ emissions still off-track from the urgently needed 1.5°C¹ compatible trajectory, it is crucial to step up towards human-rights based climate action efforts in an effective, participatory and inclusive way. That is needed even more so as the climate crisis interrelates with, and partially exacerbates, other crises with significant impacts on people's livelihoods and well-being, as well as the health of the planet overall: the biodiversity crisis, economic pressures from inflation, price increases in essential goods including food and energy, but also the indebtedness of countries which challenges their ability to prioritise people's immediate needs.

This requires an intersectional, decolonial, and gender-transformative approach to dismantle the roots of injustice and inequality, breaking down existing power relations between all genders as well as in other contexts. For Europe, to tackle the climate crisis requires not only greater domestic emission reduction ambitions towards phasing-out fossil fuels more quickly as well as effective adaptation efforts, but also to step up international and intersectional action that challenges institutionalised norm structures as part of its climate diplomacy.

This briefing paper connects the EU's efforts and approaches towards addressing the climate crisis, including in connection to the [European Green Deal](#) and in its external action, with emerging developments and debates under feminist foreign policy discourse. It aims to draw recommendations and support advocacy efforts to strengthen in particular the EU's Foreign climate policy from a feminist perspective. It does so by linking recent dynamics in EU member states around the development of feminist foreign policies and taking inspiration from approaches around the world. However, it is also based on the conviction that a truly feminist foreign policy cannot succeed without fully embedding aspects and actions central to global

¹ In light of the well documented huge risks that a surpassing of the 1.5°C limit enshrined in the Paris Agreement and the climate impact consequences associated with that entail, CAN continues to support mitigation ambition at a level required for the world to keep the change to stay within this limit. According to the recent IPCC 6th Assessment report, this requires global emission reductions of at least 43% by 2030 compared to 2019.

climate justice, given the fundamental challenges the climate crisis poses and how it interlinks with the multiple other crises mentioned before.

2. Climate action and gender (in)equality

This section seeks to provide a state of play assessment on the connections between the impacts of the climate crisis, and the climate action required, and dimensions of inequalities of gender and intersectionality. After contextualising some of the main dimensions of those links, main elements of the EU's climate diplomacy toolbox are reflected upon, including in relation to aspects of intersectionality and gender considerations.

What are some of the main arguments why climate action needs to be intersectional and include gender-transformative considerations, and ensure the exercise of agency of women in all their diversity?

Differential impacts of climate change

Climate change and its environmental, social, and economic consequences have different impacts on women and men in all their diversity as well as on non-binary individuals. These are linked to socially constructed gender roles and underlying power dynamics. A major role is also played by the still large gender care gap, which means that existing gender inequalities are reinforced by the consequences of climate change. At the same time, different genders contribute to environmental degradation and destruction and climate change in different ways, for example through carbon emissions.

In a context of growing gaps towards wealth and power accumulation it is not surprising that the climate catastrophes we are witnessing today are felt most strongly in countries where colonialism keeps perpetuating cycles of resource extraction and exploitation. This is leading to permanent and irreversible loss and damages that alter infrastructures and compromise ancestral livelihoods, particularly of Black, Indigenous, and people of colour (BIPOC) where women are systematically most impacted. In particular the role of Indigenous Peoples and communities is highlighted across the [IPCC report](#) in several regards. The recent establishment of a specific Local Communities and Indigenous Peoples Platform (LCIPP) under the UNFCCC is another expression of the growing awareness of specific attention. This is also recognised officially in the [UNFCCC context](#) which notes that “Women commonly face higher risks and greater burdens from the impacts of climate change in situations of poverty, and the majority of the world’s poor are women.” Also, the European Parliament [highlighted](#) “the intersectional and disproportionate impact of climate change on women and girls, particularly in developing countries”. This has knock-on effects already at the level of youth education, as in impact situations “girls are more likely than boys to be kept out of education to help with increasingly onerous domestic tasks”, as a [report](#) by CARE found.

[Case studies](#) from various countries in the Global South also document gender-differentiated implications of climate change loss and damage, to provide further examples, such as gender-based violence in the context of climate-induced displacement in the Lake Chad region, eroding social cohesion in rural areas of Sri Lanka in the case of climate-induced out-migration of men from those areas into cities, or increased workload of women for water supply in the aftermath of devastating storms in the Cook Islands.

The European Commission in its latest [Gender Action Plan III](#) highlighted the following statistics:



Women account for **80%** of the people displaced by the impacts of climate change



Poor women and children are up to **14** times more likely to be killed than men by a climate-fueled disaster, such as a hurricane or flood



On average, women account for **43%** of the agricultural labour force in developing countries, but present less than **15%** of all agricultural landholders

Gender differentiated impacts of climate change policies:

In this context, it is also essential to consider the gender-differentiated impacts that climate change policies may have. It is important to understand that gender-sensitive policies do not imply a direct transformation. Gender-sensitive policies are understood as those that recognize gender-specific differences and needs but do not propose a concrete plan or strategy to address them. Policies need to go beyond that notion of ‘gender sensitivity’. In contrast, gender-transformative policies explicitly seek to address the root causes of inequality, such as gender roles, norms, and behaviour. They seek to distribute power and/or access to resources more equally, including, but not limited to, economic distribution of resources, participation in decision-making, and intersectional recognition of unique experiences and knowledge.

A gender approach in climate policies often focuses on vulnerability and adaptation, integrating this approach to a lesser extent into mitigation policies. [A recent report](#) found that “discussion of gender issues and people’s intersectional vulnerabilities (such as age, ethnicity, class, caste, disability) is superficial in the influential literature on the economics of climate change mitigation, which are often framed as ‘green economies’ or ‘green growth’.

Crucial to this is the concept of 'just transition'. From a feminist perspective, according to a [WECEF publication](#), a just transition away from fossil fuels must not only be understood as a phase-out of male-dominated polluting industries and unhealthy work environments but also as a transformation to reduce economic insecurity and informal, unrecognised, and undervalued work. Mitigation policies that lack a gender-responsive approach can exacerbate existing inequalities, enhance occupational and sectoral segregation, and widen the skills and pay gap. A just transition from a women's rights and feminist perspective does not ignore the current socially constructed roles and sectors. A focus on increasing productivity of the industry and commerce - sectors in which men have a higher participation – have led to greater benefits to men than to women in all their diversity. Women's particular needs have not been prioritised. Especially women in rural areas bear the brunt of undersupply because they are responsible for nearly every aspect of the domestic energy system and their livelihood is likely to depend on activities such as subsistence agriculture and small-scale informal sector that have been neglected by centralised on-grid systems.

A further dimension of this relates to the exploitation, import and use of raw materials and resources for technologies that are regarded as important or even essential for the EU's mitigation strategies. Even though the extent of resource needs may greatly vary depending on different scenarios for emission reductions and can be lower with significant energy savings, energy efficiency and also in quantity more sustainable consumption and production patterns, there are unavoidable impacts from extractive industries and the drive for minerals is only getting bigger and financing will increasingly be geared around it. The gendered impacts of extraction and environmental issues, who benefits from these extractive industries, how local communities and the countries benefit in a sustainable way are all to be considered from a feminist perspective.

Unequal participation in climate-related decision-making

UNFCCC [highlights](#) that “Women's unequal participation in decision-making processes and economies compound inequalities and often prevent women from fully contributing to climate-related planning, policy-making and implementation.”

In “Accelerating the transition in the context of sustainable development,” a section of the [2022 IPCC report on Mitigation of Climate Change](#), scientists make clear that accelerating action does not only involve speeding up the rate of change but also addressing the underlying drivers of vulnerability and high emissions, enabling diverse communities, sectors, stakeholders, regions, and cultures to participate in just, equitable, and inclusive processes that improve the health and well-being of people and the planet. The omission of women in all their diversity in policymaking processes reinforces the ignorant notion that women are neither key actors nor agents of change but merely victims of the climate crisis. This belief, which automatically confines women to a passive role in crisis management, carries implications for how countries design their climate objectives and activities, according to [WECEF](#).

A feminist approach is required to shift power relations in colonial structures still present in the international division of labour, trade and military policies, and development models. Critical feminist lens considers intersectional elements across the social, economic, cultural and

environmental spheres to enable access, control, and effective use of resources, information, and participatory spaces.

Critical role in climate action

The UNFCCC highlights that “women can (and do) play a critical role in response to climate change due to their local knowledge of and leadership in e.g. sustainable resource management and/or leading sustainable practices at the household and community level.” Similarly, the [European Parliament](#) stressed that “gender equality is a prerequisite for sustainable development” and that “gender and women’s organisations are at the forefront when it comes to finding solutions and providing expertise in the fields of agriculture, climate, energy and preserving biodiversity, and are on the front line in combating climate change”. Supporting such claims, a [recent report](#) by CARE International provided evidence on how “sustainable approaches to women’s entrepreneurship, formal and informal work, and redefining the concept of green jobs, can lead to an inclusive and gender-just future.” Moreover, the re-evaluation of the value given to care-work plays a crucial role in a sustainable and gender-responsive just transition.

Renewable and decentralised energy solutions hold multiple opportunities and enormous potential for climate protection and social justice. In gender-just energy projects and programs, women are not merely seen as rights holders but also as critical partners, development actors, experts, investors, and producers and consumers of energy. This allows them to use their variety of skills to benefit their families, communities, and countries socially, ecologically as well as economically. [Decentralised renewable energies](#) can play a significant role in this struggle and strengthen women’s self-esteem by enabling them to become active agents and decision-makers in the energy sector. This can be achieved, for example, through energy communities since they can promote women’s agency and gender equality on the community level using their network to raise awareness. Energy communities also use their democratic structures and procedures to involve all members of society, which in turn can be expanded to the national level.

The [International Renewable Energy Agency \(IRENA\)](#) for example found that in 2019, across all renewable energies which is the key tool to move us away from climate harming fossil fuels, approximately 32% of workers were women (and 40% within the PV industry), which is also considerably higher than in the oil industry (22%), but still lower than the economy-wide average (45.9%). Generally we would like to note here that while there has been an increase in attention to data related to the roles of women, there is a greater lack of knowledge and data when it comes to a truly intersectional perspective, in Europe as well as in the majority of the world, also understood as Global South.

Policymakers, therefore, need to consider whether relevant policies and practices respond to the gender-differentiated interests and priorities of women and men in all their diversity, considering who benefits from those policies. It is also clear the rapid climate transformation we need is of course much more than just a technology or industry task, or continuing the current economic systems just painted “green”. It requires deeper social and economic transformations and the related workforce and individuals to drive that forward in many other areas than hard technology.

3. Feminist foreign policy developments in the EU and climate diplomacy

This section zooms into main aspects in the development of feminist foreign policies including specific climate elements considered to inform priorities and recommendations for EU's climate diplomacy, as well the further implementation and development of other feminist foreign policies.

3.1 Key elements in current feminist foreign policies

According to the Centre for Feminist Foreign Policy (CFFP), Sweden's² adoption of an FFP in 2014 "set in motion a growing movement", with France, Spain, Mexico and Canada adopting FFPs. Germany and also the Netherlands have recently embarked on a process to develop an FFP. The German Federal Foreign Office released its guidelines "Shaping feminist foreign policy" and the Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development (BMZ) which is by far the larger player when it comes to climate finance, recently presented its strategy for a feminist development policy (so far only in a German version), on 1 March 2023.

A report by Ecorys, which analysed several FFPs from European and other countries (incl. Mexico, Canada), summarises as relatively common elements under this umbrella term areas of

- gender equality;
- rights and equality;
- gender transformative approach;
- attention to intersectionality (in addition to diversity and inclusion);
- a participatory approach.

This does not mean the FFPs are all equal or equally ambitious, and differences are also important to note. The research also brought up voices which support a feminist policy to pay attention to a) North-South relations, b) decolonisation processes and c) anti-racism. For example, Mexico's FFP also included the objective to ensure that feminist leadership and women's contributions-especially women from Indigenous, Afro- descendant and other historically excluded groups—to the development of Mexico's foreign policy are visible.

² It has to be noted here that the government which came into power in Sweden in late 2022 has formally stepped away from the previous government's feminist foreign policy - "ditched" it, as media reported - , although it remains to be seen what this will mean in practice given a continued rhetorical commitment to gender equality: <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-63311743>

Despite overall praise for dynamic developments around FFPs, some criticism raised towards some of the available FFPs includes that they are often limited to the use of only binary gender concepts (men and women), the lack of attention to the rights and needs of LGBTQI+ individuals, insufficient attention to indigenous peoples and their specific rights, and problematic policy approaches beyond the gender lens, in relation to military and security policy, an often still colonial approach.

Applying the above, a comprehensive definition of a FFP, provided by the [Centre for Feminist Foreign Policy](#), may look as follows:

*“A **Feminist Foreign Policy (FFP)** is a political framework centred around the wellbeing of marginalised people and invokes processes of self-reflection regarding foreign policy’s hierarchical global systems. FFP takes a step outside the black box approach of traditional foreign policy thinking and its focus on military force, violence, and domination by offering an alternate and intersectional rethinking of security from the viewpoint of the most vulnerable. It is a multidimensional policy framework that aims to elevate women’s and marginalised groups’ experiences and agency to scrutinise the destructive forces of patriarchy, colonisation, heteronormativity, capitalism, racism, imperialism, and militarism. CFFP believes a feminist approach to foreign policy provides a powerful lens through which we can interrogate the violent global systems of power that leave millions of people in perpetual states of vulnerability.”*

It is crucial to highlight that FFP is not something that countries just came up with. On the contrary, it is rooted in and based on decades-long activism, struggles, and work by feminists all over the world, promoting more feminist, critical and intersectional approaches to foreign and security policy. Participation and involvement in, and leading of, decision-making is a core element. And in that regard, an FFP is also a reaction to backward trends in parts of the world regarding participation and representation, or, as the [former Swedish foreign minister put it](#): “In a world with increasing resistance to women’s and girls’ rights, representation and resources, a feminist foreign policy is needed more than ever.” Climate and environment policy, and activists of all genders and indigenous background in many regards face similar backlashes in countries with reduced civic space - including in parts of Europe -, drawing another direct relation between a feminist policy perspective and climate action, highlighting also the need for feminist domestic policies.

However, it is also important to stress that an overly focus on just the equal or equitable representation of women is a reduction of what the aim of truly transformational feminist foreign policies are supposed to be, it is going way beyond a potentially more limited incremental strengthening of women’s participation. As the climate crisis reinforces existing gender and intersectional inequalities, making in particular the marginalised people in every society carry the brunt of the climate crisis (also in the minority of the world, known as well as Global North), a feminist foreign policy would also be unable to succeed without wholehearted commitment to act on the climate emergency and to pursue climate justice.

The already-mentioned research report prepared by Ecorys which analysed various feminist foreign policies concluded a number of recommendations which can be summarised as follows:

1. **Commitment at the political level** is crucial, as well as clear processes to identify capable political gender champions;
2. A **Feminist Foreign Policy valid for all foreign policy**, including that of other ministries, has the greatest added value;
3. A **participatory process for developing the FFP** with both civil servants as well as diverse civil society fits into the spirit of feminism;
4. An FFP is an excellent opportunity to increase **awareness and support on women's rights in foreign policy**;
5. **Clear assignment of responsibilities along with implementation guidance and tools are important**;
6. Provide budget and support through **gender expertise and training** per policy area, and pay specific attention to **gender transformative approaches, intersectionality and power issues**;
7. Operate driven by results (e.g. through action plans and indicators) and build in a good **accountability** mechanism, also including Southern partners and women's rights organisations.

These findings can be used to inform more specific recommendations for the EU's foreign climate policy but can be further strengthened and are therefore not the recommendations that his paper would just endorse.

Countries that are developing their FFP are mostly using financial targets similar to the EU's 85% target, based on the OECD DAC gender markers, for instance, Germany aims to use 93% of newly commissioned development cooperation project funding for measures that have gender equality as a principal or significant objective.

The EU's overall external action and foreign policy approach does not yet reflect a comprehensive feminist foreign policy design, which is not surprising given clearly varying and partially opposing positions among the diverse member states, in particular by some actively anti-feminist governments. However, it is overdue to take additional steps, including within the EU's climate diplomacy, to move towards a more feminist foreign policy approach. A [report by CFFP and the European Greens](#) came up with a comprehensive set of recommendations for a EU Feminist Foreign Policy and across key areas of foreign policy, including military and conflict, women peace and security agenda, gender equality, climate and also finance.

3.2 Climate elements in Feminist Foreign Policies

What connections do countries with outspoken feminist foreign policies make with their external climate agenda? Are there inspirations that the EU can take from those countries? This briefing does not provide the space for detailed analyses of the various FFPs in place, but drawing some general conclusions will be helpful for recommendations to the EU's climate diplomacy approach. This section therefore briefly presents climate elements that some of the countries have incorporated into their FFPs. However, it has to be noted that it is essential that any Feminist Foreign Policy is committed to climate justice and addressing the climate crisis. It is not just one element it has to be at the core and one of the key areas for any Feminist Foreign Policy. Because the same elements that exploit women and any politically marginalised groups are also at the core of exploiting this planet and our environment. So the connection is pretty clear. At the same time it is exactly these multiple marginalised groups, predominantly Black, Indigenous and Women of Color, that lead the feminist fight against the climate crisis. So any FFP that is true to its feminist elements must embrace and truly showcase that. That also means that by referencing the below examples we do not automatically suggest that the referenced FFPs match this criterion of placing climate justice at their core, rather they don't. Still, for the purpose of this paper it is useful to look at those examples, with the above limitations in mind.

Sweden

As noted above, the new Swedish government has formally stepped away from the previous government's Feminist Foreign Policy. However, for the purpose of this section it is still useful to take a look at the previous government's approach. Sweden's Ministry of Foreign Affairs in 2019 published a specific Handbook on the country's Feminist Foreign Policy.

Sweden's approach is generally guided by the 3 Rs:

- **Rights:** promote all women's and girls' full enjoyment of human rights
- **Representation:** promote women's participation and influence in decision-making processes at all levels;
- **Resources:** work to ensure that resources are allocated to promote gender equality and equal opportunities for all women and girls to enjoy human rights.

The 3Rs have been complemented by a fourth important one, on Reality, to study the context in which they're working in and to engage with local actors.

The handbook specifically mentions Sweden's involvement in the decision-making in key international climate funds – incl. the Global Environment Facility, the Green Climate fund, and the Climate Investment Funds (CIFs) – and opportunities to influence those towards gender equality, including through:

- Conditioning that organisations seeking for accreditation include gender equality;
- Including indicators relevant to gender equality in the funds' results frameworks;

- Ensuring women are involved in the design and implementation of projects

In the case of Sweden it is very interesting that gender integration in Swedish climate finance increased sharply when Sweden's FFP was introduced and has remained high since. An [Act Alliance report](#) found that “there is considerable variation between the four countries, and Sweden is the clear leader with 81% of its climate-related development finance reporting gender as an objective in 2019. Sweden’s gender integration of climate finance increased sharply in 2014, with the introduction of a Swedish feminist foreign policy, and has remained consistently high ever since.”

Canada

Canada, in its [core document](#) of the Feminist International Assistance Policy, highlights the following aspects:

- *Differentiated affectedness by climate impacts*: “Recognizing that women and girls are uniquely affected by the damaging effects of climate change”;
- *Strengthen women’s leadership and decision making in climate-related efforts*: “Canada will require that women participate actively in the design and implementation of any climate adaptation or mitigation initiatives that are funded” by the government of Canada;
- *Applying a women and girls’ lens*: Canada commits to acknowledge the particular challenges faced by women and girls, in all climate-related planning, policy-making and financing, including those developed through partnerships with local governments, civil society, the private sector and financial institutions;
- *Dedicated support to employment and business opportunities*: the document here specifically mentions the objective to actively “support greater use of renewable energy, create opportunities for women within that sector, and help ensure that climate financing is equally accessible to woman-led initiatives and enterprises”.

Spain

Also Spain’s 2021 Feminist Foreign Policy contains a few climate elements.

The document specifically mentions the “Initiative on gender and climate change” which Spain signed up to with the following commitments by 2025:

- Adopt and implement gender-responsive climate change action plans, policies or strategies;

- Improve the evidence base by supporting women’s knowledge platforms and quantifying the benefits and effectiveness of engaging women and girls in climate actions and other initiatives;
- Track progress by including relevant information in their regular reporting to UN bodies and other related fora;
- Promote and enhance innovative tools that demonstrate and measure the transformative power of women and girls’ leadership in modifying patterns of consumption to reduce carbon emissions;
- Support and promote initiatives that foster women’s and girls’ full participation and leadership in mitigation and adaptation measures.

Germany

The German Federal Foreign Office recently released [guidelines](#) for a feminist foreign policy. It highlights climate as one of its 6 pillars:

“We recognize increased inequalities and vulnerabilities as a result of the climate crisis and counteract them with our climate and energy foreign policy. Women and various social groups are important actors and leaders of our climate and energy diplomacy. We help to balance the effects of the climate crisis on women and marginalised groups.” In terms of thematic areas it specifically:

- Pays attention to the differentiated impacts of the climate crisis on women, including considerations of increased gender-based violence following climate disasters;
- Highlight the opportunities that lie in the phase-out of fossil fuels and a feminist energy foreign policy which explicitly addresses women and marginalised groups;
- Commits to actively strengthen the inclusion of women and marginalised groups in UN and international decision-making fora relevant to climate action;
- Implementing gender equality as a guiding principles in the German funding instrument “International Climate Initiative”;
- Commits to ensure gender equality is integrated into the German climate foreign policy currently under development.

Complementing this, the [feminist development policy](#) published by the Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development (BMZ), applies the 3R approach and among others:

- Highlights the differential vulnerability of marginalised groups with specific mentioning of youth, women, LGBTQI+ persons, persons with disabilities and Indigenous Peoples;
- Calls for bringing women, girls and marginalised groups into the centre of decision-making with their roles as knowledge bearers and decision-makers;

- Support the realisation of human rights of women international strategies and policies on climate action;
- And states a number of commitments to increase the access to, and protection by, finance mechanisms of in particular women.

Overall the above analysis shows a number of broadly common climate policy elements that have been explicitly mentioned or integrated into FFPs, which has been shown here for exemplary purposes, without judging these strategies to be overall in line with a feminist approach to climate policy.

4. Building blocks for the European Green Deal Diplomacy and feminist perspectives

Building on the previous section, it is necessary to assess where the EU's climate diplomacy stands with regard to its key instruments, and to look at key aspects of how gender and a broader intersectionality perspective are reflected there.

External dimension of the European Green Deal

Building on a European Commission's definition of Green Deal diplomacy, [E3G](#) has defined that "European Green Deal diplomacy is about harnessing the Green Deal's core political ambition of a net-zero economy, while leveraging the EU's market and regulatory power to facilitate faster global transitions, and make the EU a trusted global partner for building clean and resilient economies that achieve net-zero greenhouse gas emissions." Diplomacy in relation to the Green Deal emerges as a key pillar of what could be looked at as a wider climate diplomacy, despite the EGD's limitations and flaws (see also next section), and therefore is a key starting point. Drawing on [considerations](#) by the European Council on Foreign Relations, the above definition implies that the toolbox comprises at least a) diplomacy in a more narrow sense³, b) economic relations and exchange of goods and services (trade), which are relevant to the climate transformation, and influencing related rules for standard-setting, and c) financial support and cooperation through development and climate cooperation channels. Of course, credible implementation of its domestic climate agenda in line with the Paris Agreement's 1.5°C limit is an essential component, but this will not be the focus of this paper. Similarly, the

³ It has been defined comprising "spoken or written communication by representatives of states (such as leaders and [diplomats](#)) intended to influence events in the international system" which links to international negotiations for example in UNFCCC, but also to bilateral relations through external services like the EEAS.

European Council on Foreign Relations identified four key dimensions of a European Green Deal diplomacy, namely trade, climate finance, multilateralism, and domestic implementation.

When the European Green Deal was released in 2019, it lacked a comprehensive approach to its external, diplomacy dimension, with international aspects being barely mentioned in the Commission's official [Communication](#). "Making the European Green Deal work for International Partnerships" therefore emerged as a clear call by a group of environment and development NGOs, including [CAN Europe](#).

In terms of the broader implementation of activities related to the external dimension of the Green Deal, suggestions have also been made to, for example, significantly increase EU diplomatic capacity on climate action, to install an "EU climate envoy" which would also coordinate the delivery of a 3 year fast-start programme, and establish a regular dialogue on the progress of this programme between EU27 ministers of foreign affairs, environment, development and trade/economy.

Also the [European Parliament](#) requested that the Green Deal for the EU be "swiftly followed by 'Green Deal Diplomacy' that systematically includes a gender and intersectional perspective, and involves women and girls, including indigenous women, in strategic decision-making on climate change adaptation"

Furthermore, it also fell short of adequately integrating gender aspects, as [WECF's analysis](#) brought to the forefront: "Despite the European Union's declared commitment to gender equality, women are invisible in the EU's flagship European Green Deal, which risks turning the gender gap into a chasm and delaying the transition to sustainability." Unfortunately, the same may be said about migrants, children, people with disabilities, and racialised people.

Some key instruments which are of particular importance for the EU's external cooperation in relation to climate aspects and specific entry points for core elements of a feminist foreign policy are therefore briefly considered here, including the Gender Action Plan III, the bloc's council conclusions on climate diplomacy and bilateral climate diplomacy statements, the Global Gateway strategy, and some UNFCCC elements. However, given the approach of the paper this does not aim to be all-encompassing.

Green Deal diplomacy implementation

No comprehensive official assessment is available to what extent the external diplomacy dimension of the Green Deal has progressed. An entry point to understand the concrete efforts and activities of EU diplomacy are the annual reports of the (European External Action Service) EEAS. The report on 2021, published in July 2022, generally concludes in a specific section that the EEAS "significantly intensified its work on the external dimension of the Green Deal in 2021." It references the instrumental role of the Foreign Affairs Council (FAC) energy and

climate diplomacy conclusions from January 2021 in framing the EU diplomatic engagement towards partners, and further lists a number of activities in relation to addressing external aspects of the “Fit for 55” package”.^[10] This is complemented by additional information on climate aspects in relation to specific regions, with the cooperation with Africa (incl. through the 2022 AU EU summit), some Pacific and some Asian states mentioning climate.

However, the “[Climate Audit of the European Union’s Foreign Policy](#)” recently published by the think tank NewClimate Institute provides an overall analysis of key aspects and steps taken in relation to the external dimensions of the European Green Deal. Overall, it concludes that **“taking these elements into account, the EU sets a high standard in some respects, but still needs to translate announcements into widespread action.”** It finds “potential for improvement to better integrate climate into foreign policy and strengthen the coordination and coherence of climate diplomacy.”

[Criticism on the underlying conceptual approach of the Green Deal from a feminist perspective](#)

In WECF’s and the European Environmental Bureau (EEB) report “Why the European Green Deal needs ecofeminism” experts noted the fact that the European Commission presents its Green Deal as conception of a “green economy” in which its “new growth strategy” aims to “transform the EU into a fair and prosperous society, with a modern, resource-efficient, and competitive economy where there are no net emissions of greenhouse gases in 2050 and where economic growth is decoupled from resource use”. Under critical feminist lens, “greening” capitalism ignores the fact that it is exactly those power structures promoting growth-oriented and competitive economies that have led to the ecological and social crisis, as well as the deeply intertwined nature of classism and racism – failing to enhance gender, social, and climate justice, according to [WECF](#).

Linking feminist approaches and climate action, or applying a Feminist Foreign Policy perspective, the areas where the EU also gravely fails in terms of feminist climate foreign policy become apparent. A committed Feminist Foreign Policy priorities demilitarisation but when we look at the EU, quite the opposite is the case in the past years. Along with an increasing level of militarisation comes a framing of the climate crisis as a security issue. Already in 2014, the Global Security Defense Index On Climate Change reported that 70% of governments had explicitly characterised climate change as a threat to national security. At the multilateral level, the EU has also been vocal about the threat the climate crisis poses to “international stability and security”, expressing concern in particular for “European defence and security priorities” and over the possibility of EU CSDP missions operating in an environment increasingly impacted and affected by climate change (European External Action Service, 2020). However, as this characterisation continues to gain traction at the international level, one question is increasingly posed by (feminist) civil society: *whose security are we really talking about?*

This question especially arises when we see how the recent discourse around climate security has paved the way for increasingly militarised adaptation strategies as states respond with with exclusionary immigration policies, expanded border enforcement, walls and surveillance, arrests and expulsions, political repression, and militarised policing methods. Most troublingly, such strategies divert crucial resources away from endeavours capable of mitigating and adapting to the crisis itself. For example, as the [Transnational Institute \(2021\)](#) has documented, between 2013 and 2018, seven of the world's wealthiest countries, collectively responsible for 48% of the world's historic greenhouse gas emissions – spent at least twice as much on border and immigration enforcement (more than \$33.1 billion in total) than on climate measures (\$14.4 billion). Meaningfully addressing the climate crisis requires an unprecedented response rooted in global cooperation and care. It cannot be solved with violence, repression, and militarism. It is crucial that the EU collectively moves beyond militaristic understandings of national security to prioritises human security⁴, a key element of FFP, to hold all institutions, including militaries, accountable for their contribution to the climate crisis, and to prioritise justice and sustainable peace.

Increasing EU militarisation is also something heavily felt by people threatened by the climate crisis, specifically climate refugees/migrants. Women already make up 80% of climate migrants, a number that is very likely to increase with time. Yet, due to no agreed-upon and institutionalised definition of climate migration and no legal integration in international law, the situation for climate migrants remains insecure. Combining this circumstance with the increasing militarisation of EU borders, we see climate migrants experiencing militarised and violent situations on the move while also dealing with a precarious state regarding their reasons for asylum in many EU countries. The question raised must be 'how must EU climate foreign policy be structured so that it protects people and the planet?'

Climate migration and climate-induced displacement is a feminist issue and thus crucial to climate foreign policy as it not only disproportionately affects women and marginalised people but also holds specific challenges and dangers during flight such as not being considered in risk assessments or experiencing gender-based violence after natural disasters. These are circumstances to be considered not only within climate foreign policy but the EU's policy and analysis on migration in general.

⁴ As noted in General Assembly resolution 66/290, "human security is an approach to assist Member States in identifying and addressing widespread and cross-cutting challenges to the survival, livelihood and dignity of their people." It calls for "people-centred, comprehensive, context-specific and prevention-oriented responses that strengthen the protection and empowerment of all people" (United Nations Trust Fund for Human Security). Thus, human security is related to much more than conflict and war; among other aspects it entails personal, political and community as well as environmental security.

The EU's Action Plan on Gender Equality and Women's Empowerment in External Action 2021–2025

Currently, the EU Gender Action Plan III is the key policy document guiding the EU's external action from a gender perspective. It therefore should also be regarded as an important building block and political framework relevant to climate diplomacy. It rests on five key pillars:

- 85% gender responsive financing where gender equality is a secondary objective and/or 5% a principal objective - also referenced at the [Neighbourhood, Development and International Cooperation Instrument \(NDICI\)](#) regulation;
- Promoting, together with EU Member States, strategic EU engagement at multilateral, regional and country level and jointly stepping up implementation of GAP III in each partner country and Region;
- Focusing on key areas of engagement: including addressing challenges and harnessing the opportunities offered by the green transition, as well as digital transition, ending gender-based violence, promoting gender equality in education and sexual and reproductive rights, women's social and economic empowerment and equal representation and women leadership in peace and conflict resolution;
- leading by example, by establishing gender-responsive and gender-balanced leadership at top EU political and management levels;
- a quantitative, qualitative, and inclusive monitoring system to increase public accountability, ensure transparency and access to information and achieve better EU outreach on the impact.

The [Presidency Conclusions](#) that accompanied the adoption of the Gender Action Plan III from December 2020 also explicitly mentioned climate (alongside trade) as specific sectors of international cooperation where the GAP III applies. The European Parliament, in its resolution from February 2022, welcomed “the inclusion in GAP III of the priority area on climate change, given that climate change is not gender neutral, as it acts as an amplifier of existing gender inequalities.”


The Gender Action Plan (GAP III) has a number of thematic areas, for which it prioritises gender-equality actions to be integrated into EU funded programmes. The main tool to measure and achieve this aim, is by applying the ‘Gender markers’ as defined by the OECD, to all EU funded programmes, aiming at least 85% of all newly funded programmes to have gender-equality as a first or secondary objective. GAP III [highlights](#) the following actions in the area of climate change and green transition:

EU action should contribute to:

- promoting girls' and women's participation and leadership in order to ensure gender-responsive strategies to climate mitigation and adaptation, disaster risk reduction, and the inclusive and sustainable management of natural resources;
- supporting women networks in green transition sectors such as sustainable forest management, agriculture and energy;
- capacity-building, financing and support for investment in gender-responsive national climate, environment and disaster risk reduction strategies and action plans;
- supporting women's entrepreneurship and employment in the green, blue and circular economy, including clean cooking and sustainable energy, sustainable fishing activities, by promoting a gender-transformative approach to agriculture, fishing and aquaculture and food systems, based on (i) capacity building for rural women; (ii) policy reforms to regulate more fairly land tenure and to manage natural resources and (iii) economic empowerment and access to finance;
- improving data collection on the gender-differentiated impacts of climate change and environmental degradation to inform gender-responsive policies and action.

A [mid-term evaluation report](#) has been published in April 2023. The following graph highlights some key observations.

[Key trend observations according to the GAP III mid-term evaluation report:](#)



Furthermore, the following findings and conclusions are particularly relevant from the perspective of the purpose of this paper:

- The EU, supporting gender equality mainly through gender mainstreamed interventions, should put in place the human resources at all levels to ensure gender mainstreaming

requirements and the OECD-DAC gender marker system are fully understood by all staff;

- The EU should further train, coach, advise, and motivate its staff to implement GAP III, relying on gender-responsive leadership;
- The EU should strengthen gender analysis at the beginning of each key programming stage (i.e., multi-annual programming, annual programming, and design of specific interventions);
- The EU should more strongly align the Multiannual Financial Framework (MFF) and GAP III cycles. The EU should also clarify the role of Gender Country Profiles (GCPs) and CLIPs as country-level operational documents strongly linked to Multiannual Indicative Programmes (MIPs), supporting EU programming, acting as a bridge between MIPs and Annual Action Programmes/action documents stewarded by the GFPs;
- The EU should improve the monitoring of GEWE (Gender Equality and Women's Empowerment) actions, their utility and their adequacy;
- The EU should clarify that, while it wishes partnership and will always seek common ground for cooperation, it will call out and respond to partner country policies incompatible with international law on GEWE and with GEWE values;
- The 85% Gender Marker 1/Gender Marker 2 share target for committed actions in NDICI-GE played a decisive role and helped to increase the volume of funds available for GEWE-oriented actions. Those funded by the 2021-2027 MFF marked as G1+G2 increased by 45% compared to the previous MFF;
- While the Team Europe Initiative is still in its early stages, gender appears to be adequately represented in initiatives in areas such as green economy and digital transformation, although these are only recently emerging.

Unfortunately, the thematic area Green Transition has not been a focus area of the evaluation, so there are hardly any specific recommendations.

The [2022 Annual Report on the implementation of the EU's External Action Instruments](#) finds that programming documents for the EU budget Global Europe Instrument are inconsistent in their attention to or application of the GAP III objectives, and there is no clear application of a gender transformative approach. The use of a gender lens at a macro level is limited e.g. employment of women and girls in which sectors; how modalities of finance can improve or exacerbate gender equality; challenges in access to finance and land tenure etc., as also a [CAN Europe briefing on the Africa-EU partnership](#) suggests. Another often forgotten area is that of women as informal workers and the impact on their livelihoods from a transition to climate resilient solutions, where women are often overlooked in the just transition programmes.

Furthermore, the EU Gender Action Plan can only be effective if it translates into National Action Plans and other country-specific laws, programs, and strategies that target gender inequality and climate action. The Country Level Implementation Plans (CLIPs) for GAP III are an important starting point here. An [op-ed](#) published shortly after the EC's communication on the

GAP visibly highlighted this concern by showcasing areas of setbacks within EU member states as well as specific EU initiatives, including the fact that the Council failed to agree conclusions on the GAP due to major resistances from a bloc of Eastern European countries. There must be clear communication and implementation efforts in place to urge EU member states to not only honour the EU Gender Action Plan but make efforts in their respective countries, so in the long run, climate and feminist action go hand in hand full circle. *“Walking the talk”* will therefore also be essential with regard to gender equality.

Ministerial diplomacy conclusions as a policy tool

On a more political level, the EU, mainly through their foreign ministers, signed off various conclusions on climate and energy diplomacy, tentatively on an annual basis, with the most recent one from March 2023 in response to the COP27 outcomes. These complemented climate policy specific conclusions such as those usually agreed a few weeks before the COP by the environment ministers and the finance ministers (ECOFIN). While the climate diplomacy conclusions overall have become more comprehensive, the approach to gender equality in the conclusions (let alone a feminist foreign policy approach) stagnated for several years. Climate diplomacy conclusions in 2019, 2020, 2021 and 2022 were basically copy-and-paste exercises of the vague statement that the “EU will continue to uphold, promote and protect gender equality and women’s empowerment”. Therefore, comparatively, the 2023 climate and energy diplomacy conclusions from March 2023 can be seen as at least a step in a more ambitious and feminist direction, which also [CAN Europe](#) asked for in advance.

<p>Council conclusion s on Climate and Energy Diplomacy ,March 2023</p>	<p>41. In this regard, the Council recalls its Conclusions from October 2022 on the importance to respect and promote human rights, [...] as well as gender equality and the full enjoyment of all human rights by women and girls and their empowerment when taking action to address climate change</p> <p>42. The Council is committed to promoting a human rights-based and gender-responsive approach to climate action, promoting social justice, fairness and inclusiveness in the global transition towards climate neutrality, full, equal and meaningful participation and engagement of women in climate-related decision-making and fully meeting our human rights obligations when taking action to address climate change</p>
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However, the conclusions still lack any meaningful call for actions, or changes in the climate diplomacy approach, from a gender and/or feminist perspective, and this despite emerging developments and attention to gender equality in the climate space. Terms such as ‘empowerment’ require specific and true meanings/resources for their implementation in practice – otherwise, they remain as political rhetoric.

Bilateral climate and energy declarations

As another important tool of climate diplomacy, various recent **bilateral declarations** have paid attention to both climate and energy issues, as well as gender aspects, however, rarely in a combined view. The [2021 Joint EU-India' Leaders' Meeting statement](#), for example, reaffirms and strengthens cooperation, including through the EU-India High-Level Dialogue on Climate Change and the EU India Energy Panel, in a number of critical areas across the energy and climate spectrum, including adaptation efforts. It also “reaffirmed our commitment to protecting and promoting all human rights, including gender equality and women empowerment in all spheres of life, and the importance we attach to our cooperation.” But it did not draw any connections between the two. Similarly the renewed [Africa-EU Partnership](#) agreed in February 2022 at the EU AU summit lacked sufficient attention to gender equality or climate, and their intersection, as highlighted by a [CAN Europe briefing](#). At least both partners basically commit to promoting “gender equality and women's empowerment in all spheres of life” and “the inclusion of women, young people and the most disadvantaged”, while also aiming to preserve the climate.

Global Gateway

The **Global Gateway** strategy can be looked at as one key finance and implementation tool to advance the EU's green deal diplomacy, labelled a “positive offer: an EU plan for major investment in infrastructure development around the world.” Its main elements were laid out in a specific [European Commission Communication](#) from December 2021.

The Gateway Communication, among others, promises that:

- “Projects will live up to the European Green Deal oath to ‘do no harm’ and ensure the use of environmental impact assessments and strategic environmental assessments”, and that
- “We will guarantee that projects and investments **be inclusive, notably in terms of gender equality.**”

However, beyond that gender considerations were shockingly absent from the Global Gateway communication, which, surprisingly, also missed any references to the EU's Gender Action Plan III, for example, which was adopted a year before (see next chapter). This was a missed opportunity, as linking these documents would have made it easier to communicate climate action to EU citizens, offered collaboration between policymakers, researchers and feminist civil society and “normalised” the connection between climate and feminist action on a EU-wide level. An [E3G report](#) prepared for the European Greens also highlighted the need to “integrate human rights and gender equality considerations into co-development dialogues, as well in due diligence processes” of the Global Gateway, among other recommendations.

As a geopolitical and diplomatic strategy the Global Gateway overlays and gives further direction to financing from EU budget external action instruments, and its governance includes the Global Gateway Board, comprising the President of the Commission and Member States Ministers of Foreign Affairs, a new Business Advisory Group to ensure private sector involvement, and a promised dialogue with civil society. Legislation for these instruments was finalised in 2021, and includes gender objectives, guided by the EU GAP III, and in the case of the largest instrument, [Global Europe](#), a target for 85% of all new external financing to have gender equality objectives. The lack of attention so far to gender in the Global Gateway represents a missed opportunity to advance an intersectional approach and gender equality values, despite the promise of ‘democratic values offer certainty and fairness for investors, sustainability for partners and long-term benefits for people around the world’.

UNFCCC gender action plan and implementation

In 2014, Parties to the UNFCCC adopted the Lima Work programme on Gender and Climate Change, which was extended for another two years in 2016 and complemented in 2017 by the Gender Action Plan adopted at COP23. At COP25 in 2019, Parties agreed on a **5-year enhanced Lima Work Programme on Gender and its Gender Action Plan**, which underwent an intermediate progress review in 2022 at COP27.

In general, the negotiations on the review of the Gender Action Plan concluded with no substantial progress and may even be viewed as failed by some. Advocates and activists reported the lack of progress at COP27 on gender-responsive implementation and a failure of Parties to: truly prioritise this agenda item; recognize the increasing impacts that loss and damage are having on the lives of women and girls in all their diversity; finance gender-responsive implementation promoting direct access for grassroots women and women’s groups; and resource National Gender and Climate Change Focal Points (NGCCFPs). The [UNFCCC Women and Gender Constituency](#) found that “the review fails to meaningfully address the most recent IPCC report, which includes a chapter on gender and climate justice in identifying pathways for a just transition – a starting point for any gender transformative implementation of climate action”.

Of particular relevance to the purpose of this paper is the [European Union’s submission](#) into this review from March 2022.

With regard to the integration of gender aspects in the EU’s external action implementing activities on the various UNFCCC GAP work streams the EU in its submission, inter alia,

- References the five pillars of its own GAPIII but fails to provide any update on implementation progress, noting that "no assessment is available at this point of time";
- Highlights that gender equality and empowerment of women should be mainstreamed in all areas of the UNFCCC and the Paris Agreement, including climate finance, and also advocates for a closer collaboration and exchange of the finance negotiators with their national gender and climate change focal points;
- Notes that "due to significant progress made in recent years" Parties and the UNFCCC Secretariat are now in a better position to gather "lessons learnt and critical assessments are now more feasible after domestic planning and implementation of climate policies", so that such exchanges should be intensified;
- Requests that the ownership of the gender-climate nexus should be broadened, with increased attendance and participation of men in gender negotiations and high-level events, basically not treating it as an issue which is expected to be taken care of primarily by women, or the gender experts and negotiators;
- Sees further potential to promote "exchanges of best practices and experience on how best integrate gender aspects and reporting of sex-disaggregated data", with the upcoming submission of the biennial transparency reports (BTRs), and "would further welcome the exploration of how gender could be reflected in the Global Stocktake".

One particular element of the UNFCCC Gender Action Plan is also to ensure gender balance in the composition of the numerous UNFCCC constituted bodies, such as the Adaptation Fund Board, the COP Bureau, the Paris Committee on Capacity Building, among others. An examination of the composition information of those bodies by CAN Europe, dated 29 December 2022, shows that **out of 53 representatives from EU Member States or the Commission, 28 are currently men (53%), and 25 women (47%)**. While this does not quite match a 50/50 balance, it is considerably more balanced than the overall distribution across all bodies and countries in the last years, which increased from 31% in 2019 to 38% in 2022 but is still far away from 50/50, according to the [UNFCCC Secretariat](#).

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5. Towards a feminist EU climate diplomacy: key recommendations

An EU Feminist Foreign and Climate Policy will only be truly transformative if it aims to re-evaluate the entire economic rationale of hyper-capitalism and the power structures and colonial legacies embedded in the conception of international investments, traditional aid or assistance relationships, which have their own issues tied to postcolonialism and political economy interests. For this purpose, [global and national level regulation](#) is required to ensure human rights, labour standards, intersectional justice and climate and environmental standards, and peace.

The application of a feminist approach demands a continuous dialogue, co-creation, and implementation of diverse actions and strategies together with civil society groups and movements from the majority of the world, also named as Global South, under an intersectional framing for environmental policies to benefit people equally. Analysing how social characteristics intersect with each other is fundamental to understanding how policies may and are leading to unique experiences of discrimination as well as the structural, historical and institutional root causes of such discrimination.

This requires arduous and challenging work across all levels of influence of a feminist foreign and climate policy, in which feminist values on intersectionality, anti-racism, and decoloniality provide a compass for transforming institutional structures. It also requires rethinking strategies and ways of communication, entirely committing to not viewing climate and gender action as separate areas that overlap but as completely entangled and connected issues. This is what truly feminist climate action entails. Of course, these need to be seen as integral to key climate action steps that need to be taken, and for which key demands have been raised by [CAN Europe](#) previously. This includes the need for the EU to raise its own mitigation ambition to levels compatible with 1.5°C (at least 65% reduction by 2030 and climate neutrality by 2040), and to increase new and additional climate finance to Global South countries with at least 50% going to adaptation, and additional resources for loss and damage.

Recommendations

1. Clear political commitment for a feminist approach to climate diplomacy

- **Commit to developing a feminist foreign policy** that has climate justice at its core, and that advocates for a care economy, redressing the international constraints that govern fiscal policy space for the public and care domains, instead for the perpetuation of arms trade and militarism, particularly with non-democratic countries that undermine human rights;
- **Guarantee a truly feminist foreign policy** by committing and taking action to stop colonial behaviours and practices integrated in funding mechanisms, structures and requirements of international aid and cooperation, in which the conception of

development is framed as a business opportunity for the private sector of the country providing aid and/or financial resources;

- Continuously strengthen gender, intersectional and feminist aspects in **future climate and energy diplomacy conclusions by the Council**;
- Ensure that **gender justice is pursued as a stand-alone objective** in all country strategies, mission mandates, policy strategies, and dialogues with partner countries, including local-level political dialogues and human rights dialogues;
- Commit to developing EU climate policies that have feminism at the core and consider its international impacts on women in all their diversity, to respect the principle of coherence of cooperation policies with other international policies;
- Strengthen and ensure political coherence to advance towards the 1.5°C goal by supporting Global South countries in the **phase-out of fossil fuels and eliminating fossil fuel subsidies**, in addition to accelerating the EU's phase out within their territory and extraterritorial responsibilities), and support the elaboration of a **gender-just fossil fuel non-proliferation treaty**.

2. Deliver on international climate finance commitments with a strengthened gender lens:

- The EU and its Member States must clearly commit to stepping up new and additional public finance for climate action in the so-called developing countries immediately, by scaling up commitments of public finance towards the \$100 billion annually no later than 2023 (and \$600 billion over 2020-2025), with a focus on scaling up grants, and not just by relying on intransparent claims of projected mobilised finance;
- The EU should provide clear plans on how it will contribute to at least doubling adaptation finance by 2025 compared to 2019 levels and then reaching 50% adaptation finance;
- Ensure that the establishment of **funding arrangements to address loss and damage** respond to the ecological debt of countries according to their historic responsibilities and capacities (in particular for the Global North) by coordinating, mobilising, and channelling new, additional, needs-based and adequate financial resources for the achievement of a true feminist foreign policy;
- In preparation of the Green Climate Fund's (GCF) 2nd replenishment (to be concluded in October 2023), further enhance the **GCF's approach to gender mainstreaming and promoting** improved access for local environmental and women's organisations through flexibility, active outreach, and by making funding available for existing national and regional funds that can very effectively and efficiently reach local groups in their region with smaller sums;
- Redistribution of budget going into unsustainable and damaging action such as risky and unproven GHG removals, fossil-fuel industries and militarization towards gender-just climate action

3. Increase the participation of women and other historically marginalised groups in decision-making in the climate diplomacy context:

- Take greater EU action on the COP27 commitment to “increase the **full, meaningful and equal participation of women in climate action**”;
- Further enhance efforts to have at least **50% of EU and MS representatives in international climate constituted bodies** (such as under the UNFCCC) **to be women in all their diversity**;
- Enhance support for politically marginalised groups, in particular women in all their diversity from the majority of the world, to be **fully involved in national and international processes and negotiations** on addressing the climate emergency, including the UNFCCC, and to support partner states and international organisations to ensure comprehensive protection of women environmental activists.

4. Strengthen feminist aspects in EU specific finance instruments:

- **Significantly increase investments and finance for [gender-just climate solutions](#)** led by grassroots and feminist organisations in the majority of the world which have proven evidence on addressing inequality and discriminatory barriers;
- Promote and enhance innovative tools that demonstrate and measure the **transformative power of women and girls’ leadership** in modifying patterns of consumption to reduce carbon emissions, and to effectively build resilience;
- Adaptation commitments should be anchored into the Global Europe Instrument in the EU budget Mid-Term Review through a **dedicated adaptation spending target** (which building on the previous budget cycle could achieve 60% of the climate spending target). Principles of Locally Led Adaptation should be followed;
- **Accessible and effective monitoring and complaint mechanisms** should be implemented systematically to allow any negative impacts of EU-funded investments on local communities and final beneficiaries to be addressed. Since energy projects in contexts where respect for human rights and the rule of law is low can be associated with land degradation, land grabbing and human and Indigenous Peoples’ rights abuses, a centralised grievance mechanism for the EFSD+ should be established and communities should be systematically informed about their rights;
- Enhance efforts to ensure that the **GAP objective of 85%** of external finance integrating gender is also met within climate finance as soon as possible, noting different levels in EC and the Member States, and that the **USD 100bn delivery plans integrates a gender perspective**;
- Blended finance through the EFSD+ and EU Member States’ development agencies should be structured to ensure a far greater share is accessible to cooperatives, SMEs and micro-entrepreneurs engaging in climate action;
- Make available dedicated funding for the financial, psychological, emotional, and institutional support of climate migrants to ensure a safer and structured arrival in the

EU. Support climate action by climate migrants and ensure the participation of climate migrants around issues concerning climate foreign policy.

5. Re-orient the Global Gateway strategy with a strengthened feminist policy lens:

- The Global Gateway Strategy should be re-oriented around and build on core climate and development objectives in the Global Europe Instrument, but with a stronger focus on unlocking finance for regional and local climate and energy infrastructure which answers to the needs of women and girls, including a stronger focus on adaptation as well as gender equality and social inclusion;
- Ensure **Global Gateway** responds to the EU's GAP III five pillars and in particular the first pillar's objective for a gender-transformative, rights-based and intersectional approach;
- This requires restructuring its governance to ensure participation of developing countries' representatives, including local communities and women's rights organisations; providing transparency about the Business Advisory Group's role and ensuring diverse participation outside big business within it.

6. Commit to feminist aspects in the European External Action Service (EEAS)

- Ensure **gender justice is actively embedded in and integrated into all climate diplomacy** work undertaken by EEAS, including close cooperation between the Ambassador for Gender and Diversity and the Climate Diplomacy lead;
- Mandate the European Commission and the EEAS to ensure that targeted conversations on the **gender and climate change link are included in all relevant bilateral high-level dialogues on climate and energy** matters, the climate diplomacy weeks, and report annually on advancing this link;
- Ensure that the **EEAS annual activity report** specifically addresses activities and progress in relation gender justice and climate justice;
- **EU delegations in partner countries should be better capacitated to deal with climate mainstreaming and intersections with development gender justice**; CSO Roadmaps should be updated to reflect the actors working across climate and gender where necessary.

7. Implement feminist aspects in monitoring and data collection

- Adopt a **more rigorous and independent practice for monitoring, evaluation, research and learning** tied to feminist policies' intended outcomes, including through ensuring gender justice is a **mandatory and explicit component of progress monitoring of the external dimensions of the European Green Deal**;
- **Improve and fund gender- and sex-disaggregated data collection** and analysis around loss and damage (particularly conducted by civil society), including by prioritising

collective efforts to map the disproportionate impacts and related needs of the climate crisis.

CONTACTS

Sven Harmeling
International Climate Policy Coordinator
[sven.harmeling @caneurope.org](mailto:sven.harmeling@caneurope.org)

Eleonora Allena
Communications Coordinator
eleonora.allena@caneurope.org

Nina Tramullas:
Communications Coordinator
nina.tramullas@caneurope.org
info@caneurope.org

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