Urgently address the collective shortfall in global climate action
Ten years since the adoption of the Paris Agreement, the EU must act decisively on the outcomes of the Global Stocktake by committing to a rapid, equitable fossil fuel phase-out and aligning its NDC with a 1.5°C pathway. COP30 must not only translate the outcomes of the Global Stocktake into concrete pathways to a 1.5°C future, but also close the ambition and finance gaps from GST1 and lay a credible foundation for the next Stocktake.
In its 2025 Advisory Opinion, the International Court of Justice affirmed that 1.5°C is the consensus goal of the Paris Agreement and that states must base their climate action on the best available science, reflecting the principle of common but differentiated responsibilities, and the EU’s historical responsibility. The International Court of Justice also made it clear that only submitting an NDC is not enough to comply with the obligations under the Paris Agreement. The content of the NDC is equally relevant to determine compliance and must be capable of making an “adequate contribution” to the achievement of the 1.5°C objective. To determine this contribution, States have limited discretion and need to take into account the fairness principles of the Paris Agreement, still the NDC put forwards must represent the highest possible ambition. Moreover, the Judges emphasized that the obligation to prevent significant harm to the climate system necessarily extends to fossil fuel production, consumption, and infrastructure and therefore reinforcing the commitments under the first GST.
The EU should support a COP30 decision that responds to the UNFCCC’s NDC synthesis report and addresses the potential collective ambition gap and deciding actions for course correction to a 1.5°C aligned pathway. With their overall significance in terms of economic, social and emission parameters, G20 countries have a particular responsibility to ensure humanity bends the emission curve quickly and moves on a pathway consistent with the emission reductions identified for 1.5°C pathways.
A COP30 agreement, potentially early on in the session, on the United Arab Emirates–Belém work programme on indicators for measuring progress achieved towards the targets under the Global Goal on Adaptation could strengthen guidance to countries, and their confidence for enhancing the adaptation components in their NDCs, to be facilitated by increased adaptation finance provision.
COP30 must also serve as the bridge between the formal negotiation track and the Brazilian Presidency’s Action Agenda. The EU should actively support the Presidency in ensuring that the Action Agenda complements and strengthens COP30 outcomes, avoids becoming a parallel process, and delivers tangible advances in line with CAN positions. The Action Agenda can play a crucial role in facilitating discussions and highlighting best practices, but it does not have the authority to mandate country-level commitments.
Protecting forests, wetlands and other natural GHG sinks and reservoirs – and preventing ecosystem collapse – will be critical to the success of COP30. Momentum from CBD COP16 decisions on biodiversity-climate synergies, as well as the Advisory Opinion of July 2025 of the International Court of Justice referring to the obligations under the Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD) that contribute to ensuring the protection of the climate system, must be reflected in the COP30 outcome, for example through a joint Rio Convention mandate, a mandate to address implementation of the GST1 outcome and robust indicators under the Global Goals on Adaptation to capture ecological integrity, and recognition of the the benefits of ecosystem-based adaptation and the risk of ecosystem collapse. Urgent measures to reach the collective goal of ending the destruction of forest, wetlands and other natural ecosystems by 2030 and address the primary drivers of ecosystem loss should be taken to address the current fragmentation of ecosystem-related action across many work streams. They should be informed by the Mitigation Work Programme forests dialogue, ensure sectoral action for implementation under the GST/ UAE Dialogue and should include timelines for fossil fuel phase-out, exclusion of large scale forest biomass energy, ecosystem protection, and centering Indigenous People’s and local communities’ collective rights, as well as recognition of the wider social, health, and environmental benefits of ecosystems.
In terms of the EU’s own NDC, it is highly concerning that by the time of the September deadline the EU was not able to submit its new NDC with 2035 target dates. This leaves the current NDC with 2030 dates and the 2050 climate neutrality target as the only official reference point. Commission President von der Leyen, on the basis of the “statement of intent”, reaffirmed that there would be an NDC before COP30. The pressure is high on the EU to now conclude the discussions on a 2040 target and derive from that the 2035 NDC in the most ambitious manner. However, the proposal put on the table by the European Commission with a 90% reduction target, potentially opened up for international credits, is not aligned with the EU’s fair share for 1.5°C. In current negotiations, various member states and parts of the European Parliament work to water down its ambition even further.
CAN’s expectations on the content of the EU 2040 target and the NDC with 2035 targets have been laid out clearly, which in essence ask for achieving domestic net zero emissions by 2040 at the latest and a 2035 target of at least 94% net domestic emission reductions. Further details are available in a recent letter to ministers and more detailed position papers. Other coalitions of multiple stakeholders, such as the Coalition for Higher Ambition, have called for at least 90% domestic reductions by 2040, and at least 72.5% by 2035.
Deliver a Just Transition Mechanism
All parties should support the establishment, at COP30, of an International Mechanism for Just Transition to accelerate a holistic just transition across all sectors and between countries. Such a mechanism should operationalize the principles of equity and Common But Differentiated Responsibilities and Respective Capabilities and enable collective progress towards the long-term goals of the Paris Agreement. It should facilitate just transitions away from fossil fuels, support the transformation of agriculture and food systems, promote sustainable industrial processes, enable the inclusive and equitable deployment of renewable energies including ensuring energy access, and ensure precautionary management of ecosystems and natural resources, including an equity and sufficiency approach to supply chains for transition minerals.
The EU should champion the adoption of a comprehensive set of principles, safeguards and an international action plan for Just Transition, ensuring that efforts are transformational, rights-based, and aligned with the Paris Agreement. Just Transition policies must promote decent work and labour rights, alternative livelihoods, inclusive social and economic dialogue, social protection, and biodiversity protection; all while centering the rights of workers, women, Indigenous Peoples, youth, and other marginalised groups. JT policies must be enabled by international cooperation on finance, capacity building, technology transfer, structural reform of the international financial system, together with transformational and predictable levels of investment in developing countries.
Just Transition must be recognised as a key enabler of enhanced ambition and effective implementation. All Parties should integrate comprehensive, rights-based Just Transition strategies into Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs) and National Adaptation Plans (NAPs) contributing to long-term resilience, equity, ecosystem restoration and sustainable development. Accordingly, the need for financing of JT policies must be acknowledged and JT plans must be eligible for climate finance, while all existing climate finance should adhere to the agreed principles and safeguards of Just Transition as mentioned above.
Align Climate Finance with 1.5°C
The ICJ confirmed that under the UNFCCC and the Paris Agreement parties incur binding obligations on developed country Parties to provide financial assistance, technology transfer and capacity-building to vulnerable states. Parties are to implement their obligations under Paris Agreement Article 9 in a manner and at a level that allows for the achievement of the objectives listed in Article 2. This level can be evaluated on the basis of several factors, including the capacity of developed States and the needs of developing States. In addition, a State’s provision of fossil fuel subsidies may constitute an internationally wrongful act which is attributable to that State, and States also have a due-diligence obligation to regulate private actors – to prevent, mitigate, and remedy climate harm – which has important implications for regulation of public and private finance.
The New Collective Quantified Goal
The COP29 decision on the New Collective Quantified Goal does not respond adequately to climate finance needs of developing countries, which could sit at at least $400bn for loss and damage, at least $300bn for adaptation, and at least $300bn for mitigation, measured in grant-equivalent terms. The EU and its member states should scale up new and additional public climate finance through bilateral and multilateral channels, and through the new Multiannual Financial Framework (MFF), to reach their fairshare contributions by 2035 in line with the USD 300billion goal of the New Collective Quantified Goal (NCQG), considering this a lower bound for climate finance provision, substantially scaling up grants, and specifying adaptation and loss and damage components. We expect all EU Member States to announce, at or before COP30, how they will scale up their individual contribution between now and 2030, updating the previous round of pledges and announcements for the period up to 2025.
To respond to the NCQG decision of at least tripling annual outflows from the UNFCCC climate funds from 2022 levels by 2030, the EU and Member States to increase their contributions to these funds in line with this decision.
The Baku-Belem Roadmap is due to be published in October ahead of the COP. To ensure implementation, the EU should support a decision at CMA7 addressing next steps to implement the NCQG and the “Baku to Belém Roadmap to 1.3T”, recognising the importance of grants and public finance for the $300 billion goal in particular, with a focus on short-, mid- and long-term actions.
Ideally the Roadmap should take the form of an action plan, identifying actions and actors, and an implementation phase with targets and objectives. It should recognise the importance of the provision of grants and high-quality public climate finance that is new, additional, predictable and adequate, and should provide scenarios on how to achieve true balance between mitigation and adaptation, and quantified milestones for increasing adaptation finance and loss and damage finance. The Roadmap should take a realistic approach to blended finance mobilisation and the role of private finance; and explore ways to improve mobilisation ratios in a way that puts communities’ need before profits and without compromising on the achievement of developing countries’ climate and development goals. Discussions around enabling environments must not focus only on domestic regulatory frameworks but also international institutions and processes which impact developing countries financial flows and fiscal space, for example the World Bank and IMF, MDBs, multilateral debt, tax and trade processes. Together with others, the EU should consider how the international financial architecture can become a more enabling environment to boost public spending and investment in climate action. This requires strong debt and tax reform (for more on tax, see tax section below).
Article 9.1, Paris Agreement
In light of the weaknesses of the NCQG, the G77 have supported a new agenda item on Paris Agreement Art. 9.1 at SB62, and SB Chairs will take stock of progress on consultations and report back at SB63 on outcomes for Parties’ consideration including potentially a standalone agenda item on this matter. The EU should publicly recognise its obligations to provide climate finance, and engage constructively in determining agenda space to address climate finance provision by developed country Parties which will enable accountability on Art 9.1. Additionality, predictability, concessionality, and transparency should be central. It will be important to strengthen reporting on climate finance provision through the Enhanced Transparency Framework, and clarify contributions to the NCQG, as well as the Standing Committee on Finance biennial Report from 2028 on the NCQG.
Scale-up adaptation funding
The EU should support a decision on a new public grant-based commitment on adaptation finance, to replace the ‘Glasgow commitment’ (doubling). While adaptation finance needs are much higher, developed country parties need to at least triple their collective provision of public climate finance for adaptation to developing country Parties by 2030, based on the Glasgow commitment to double by 2025. This is in the context of their continued and existing obligation to provide financial resources to assist developing country Parties with respect to both mitigation and adaptation under the Convention, recalling Article 9, paragraph 1, of the Paris Agreement; and in the context of achieving a balance between mitigation and adaptation in the provision of scaled-up financial resources, recalling Article 9, paragraph 4, of the Paris Agreement. This should also be anchored in the Baku to Belem roadmap, along with a pathway to scaling up the provision and mobilisation of adaptation finance.
An adaptation finance commitment would be an important complement to agreeing the indicator system for the full operationalisation of the Global Goal on adaptation with fit for purpose indicators, including means of Implementation (MoI) indicators, ensuring they reflect grant-based, accessible finance and differentiated responsibilities.
Universal access to climate-resilient water, sanitation, and hygiene (WASH) services is vital to allow communities on the frontlines of the climate crisis to adapt to climate change. In line with the recent European Water Resilience Strategy, the EU should ensure its policy coherence to face the triple planetary crisis by securing means of adaptation implementation for the Global Goal on Adaptation’s water and sanitation target. This includes developing a stronger implementation framework of the EU’s UN Water 2023 commitments and ensuring alignment with COP29’s Baku Water Dialogue by putting climate-resilient water and sanitation infrastructures at the core of the EU climate agenda.
Adaptation Fund
The Adaptation Fund (AF) was established under the Kyoto Protocol to finance concrete adaptation projects and programmes in developing countries and is now transitioning to serve exclusively under the Paris Agreement. With a Board majority from developing countries and a mandate to provide full-cost adaptation grants, the AF advances country ownership and institutional strengthening while channeling finance to those most vulnerable to the climate crisis. However, the Fund continues to struggle with the predictability and stability of its resources. While revenues are expected from the mandatory 5% share of proceeds under Article 6.4 and possible voluntary contributions under Article 6.2 of the Paris Agreement, these are unlikely to materialise before 2026 and are inherently volatile. The fund relies on annual resource mobilisation at COPs — through self-set minimum floors. Without ambitious predictable, multi-year contributions, the Fund will remain constrained.
The urgency of this challenge is underscored by the fact that in both 2023 and 2024 developed countries fell far short of the AF’s resource mobilisation targets, leaving the Fund unable to reach even its modest annual goals. For 2025, the AF Board has therefore shifted from setting an annual target to adopting a minimum resource mobilisation floor of USD 300 million — the bare minimum to keep the Fund functioning, but far below what is needed to deliver a meaningful scale-up. At COP30, the EU and its member states must take the lead in ensuring that this floor is met in full and in committing to steadily increase their contributions beyond it. Meeting and raising AF resource mobilisation targets will be essential not only to strengthen the Fund itself, but also to fulfil the NCQG commitment to at least triple outflows by 2030 and to significantly increase the share of finance delivered through multilateral climate funds.
Loss and Damage finance
Developed country parties should scale up finance to address loss and damage. A substantial part of financing can be channeled by making new pledges to the Fund for Responding to Loss and Damage. The EU should ensure that the resource mobilisation strategy of the new fund encompasses both developed country contributions, other parties in a position to do so, and a share of proceeds from new polluter pays taxes and levies.
Article 2.1c of the Paris Agreement
All parties should make progress on shifting all financial flows in line with Article 2.1c of the Paris Agreement, developing comprehensive regulatory systems and incentives for actors to transition in a just and equitable manner. Developed parties and other parties responsible for the largest global proportions of fossil fuel and climate-harmful subsidies and private finance flows must take the lead in phasing out subsidies and regulating private finance.
At CMA7 Parties should take a decision on Art. 2.1c to establish a process which would support deeper engagement and progress between parties on this goal, and should agree key principles to guide efforts on shifting flows in a just and equitable manner, in the context of the whole of Article 2, encompassing both domestic and international action.
At COP28 Parties already agreed action in the 1st Global Stocktake decision which called on Parties to contribute to global efforts on phasing out inefficient fossil fuel subsidies that do not address energy poverty or just transitions, as soon as possible. This must be a key objective of domestic action on Art 2.1c, to phase out fossil fuel and other climate harmful subsidies from government budgets, in public national and international financial institutions, through fiscal and monetary policy. Parties should also take market-shaping regulatory approaches to private finance which move beyond improving transparency and disclosure. The private financial sector should be required to halve its financed greenhouse gas emissions by 2030, to align with guidance from the United Nations High-Level Expert Group on the Net Zero Emissions Commitments of Non-State Entities, which has made it clear that halving financed emissions by 2030 is a critical milestone for staying within the 1.5°C temperature limit. Parties should develop national finance transition plans aligned with NDCs, and a process on Art 2.1c should prioritise reporting of domestic actions through the Enhanced Transparency Framework, to drive improvement of policies in line with the Global Stocktake and Paris Agreement ambition cycle.
In terms of international action, a key objective should be to address disenablers of climate resilient development, in international financial architecture (other international processes and institutions relating to international economic governance). The UNFCCC can provide guidance, convene relevant institutions and actors, and set out an action plan on aligning international financial flows and architecture with the Paris Agreement. This should include reform to debt, tax, credit and trade institutional institutions and structures to prevent lock-in to fossil fuels and to free up fiscal space for climate action to invest in climate-resilient development in developing countries. The debt-climate nexus and the deepening debt crisis is entrenching the expansion of climate-harming industries such as fossil fuels in order to generate foreign currency for debt repayment, and demands particular attention. The EU and member state governments, as board members and shareholders of MDBs, and through their continued participation in other UN processes that the US has stepped back from, have an immensely important role to play in ensuring that Art 2.1c is defended and implemented equitably through the international economic governance ecosystem.
Global Europe Instrument, EU budget – EU’s collective climate finance
To contribute to the EU’s collective scaling up of climate finance, the Global Europe Instrument in the new MFF should be governed by a 50% climate and environment spending target and the European Commission’s budget allocation proposal for EUR 200 billion to Global Europe should be maintained. The instrument should have adaptation specified as a key climate objective, along with the locally led principles for adaptation. CAN Europe recommends a horizontal exclusion list applicable to all EU programmes and funds to operationalise the ‘do no significant harm’ principles of the European Commission’s climate mainstreaming methodology. Any support to production, processing, distribution, storage or combustion of fossil fuels, including support for low-carbon hydrogen and fuels, fossil fuel powered transportation among other climate and environmentally harmful activities should be excluded as it also runs counter to the objective of boosting the energy transition (the only exception should be clean cooking in certain circumstances).
The Global Gateway Strategy should integrate just transition principles across its focus sectors, increase its focus on adaptation, and ensure investment in local value chain creation concerning critical minerals and green hydrogen.
New taxes and levies
Fairer global tax governance would support developing countries’ resource mobilisation and free up fiscal space for socially just climate action, as well as support revenue collection and efficient taxation in the EU. The EU should constructively engage and support the intergovernmental process to adopt a UN Framework Convention on International Tax Cooperation, which should be designed with a view to ensuring a fair division of taxing rights between nation states and address comprehensively tax havens, tax abuse by multinationals, other illicit financial flows and address environmental protection. The Convention should encompass progressive environmental taxation (Terms of Reference, Art. 10.c) in line with the Polluter Pays Principle and CBDR-RC. The next step for the EU tax negotiators is to develop and adopt concrete commitments and mechanisms to deliver on the Convention’s sustainable development mandate and strengthen the link to climate goals and policies.
The EU should work with other countries to implement new taxes and levies to resource the Fund for Responding to Loss and Damage at COP30, and other funds under the UNFCCC Financial Mechanism, and should cooperate with other willing countries on these options, including through the Global Solidarity Levies Taskforce. There is also potential for contribution from existing and new taxes at the national and EU levels. The EU can implement options at EU-level which could also contribute new own resources to the MFF, including a coordinated EU-wide extreme wealth tax, and a coordinate EU-wide tax on ownership and profits of the fossil fuel industry. We suggest building on EU solidarity contribution on windfall profits used during the energy price crisis, EU law (Art. 2 of the 2022 EU Council Regulation on an emergency intervention to address high energy prices), which raised over EUR 26 billion in 2022-2023 largely from fossil fuel profits. Taxes should be designed to be socially fair and focus on the polluter pays principle, prioritising fossil fuel taxation, wealth taxation and aviation taxation.
Signals can be provided on taxation in negotiations on Article 2.1c, and actions indicated by the Baku-Belem Roadmap.
EU fossil fuel subsidies and other finance policies
Fossil fuel subsidies increase the EU’s reliance on fossil fuel imports, slow the energy transition and expose the EU to price volatility. Swift delivery on Commissioner Hoekstra and Commissioner Jørgensen’s task from the European Commission President to develop a roadmap to further scale down and phase out the use of fossil fuel subsidies is extremely important not just for Europe’s economy and competitiveness, but also to demonstrate credibility internationally, when the EU’s fossil fuel subsidies have increased in recent years.
The EU should swiftly phase out fossil fuel subsidies in a socially just manner including national, EU, international flows and export credits, making full use of all tools (including the Energy Taxation Directive, European Semester in a reformed Economic Governance Framework, Governance Regulation, reform of the EU’s State aid framework, new MFF) with the most environmentally and socially harmful FFSs phased out first, and with a just transition policy framework guiding phaseout policies and use of compensation schemes to support low income households
A number of Member States are signatories to the Coalition Coalition on Phasing Out Fossil Fuel Incentives Including Subsidies. This is an important initiative to drive progress multilaterally, the European Commission should also join this initiative.
Furthermore, the EU needs to take decisive action by prohibiting lending and investments in new fossil fuel projects and the fossil fuel companies developing them. Allowing continued public and private financial support for fossil fuel expansion undermines the EU’s climate goals and the credibility of its Sustainable Finance Framework. As highlighted by the International Energy Agency and IPCC, there is no room for new fossil fuel development if we are to limit global warming to 1.5°C.
Transform the Global Energy System
Building on the COP28 outcomes and UAE Consensus, the EU must drive international cooperation to triple renewable energy capacity, double energy efficiency, equitably phase out fossil fuels and end fossil fuel subsidies by 2030, while ensuring universal access to clean, affordable, and reliable energy for all in alignment with the SDGs. The ICJAO gives this further impetus, and outlines that failure of a State to take appropriate action to protect the climate system from GHG emissions — including via fossil fuel production, fossil fuel consumption, the granting of fossil fuel exploration licences or the provision of fossil fuel subsidies — may constitute an internationally wrongful act which is attributable to that State (ICJAO para 427).
To guide such systemic and transformative change to the energy sector, these efforts must be paired with a global Just Transition mechanism, as well as increased finance and technology support for developing countries. While the COP28 energy package was a major signal in paragraph 28 of the first Global Stocktake, it left unanswered how countries should phase out fossil fuels equitably or assume responsibility based on their capacities. With some of the world’s richest economies, including many of the EU’s closest allies, still expanding fossil fuel production, COP30 must send clear signals that the energy transition is irreversible and accelerating – to this end, the EU should champion a global fossil fuel extraction phase-out roadmap (with differentiated timelines based on the principles of equity and CBDR-RC), as well as sectoral decarbonisation roadmaps (for power, transport, industry) while supporting initiatives such as the the Beyond Oil and Gas Alliance, Powering Past Coal Alliance, and the Fossil Fuel Non-Proliferation Treaty. The EU should also enhance the Global Energy Transition Forum, and pledge support for emerging initiatives, including Colombia’s First International Conference for the Phase-Out of Fossil Fuels (anticipated April 2026). The Action Agenda can play a crucial role in facilitating discussions and highlighting best practices, but it does not have the authority to mandate country-level commitments.
The EU must lead by example with ambitious, binding energy targets: at least 50% renewables and 20% energy savings by 2030, and halving energy use within a fully renewable system by 2040. It must also prioritise methane reduction, pushing for a binding global target of at least 75% methane cuts by 2030, linked to a full fossil fuel phase-out.
To maintain integrity, the EU should clearly reject international carbon credits in its 2040 target and NDC. Similarly, the EU’s energy transition must not replicate extractive dynamics. Raw material sourcing and trade partnerships must be transparent, rights-based, and locally beneficial, with strong safeguards for Indigenous Peoples and local communities, including Free, Prior and Informed Consent (FPIC).
Finally, the EU should support a strong outcome from the Mitigation Work Programme to close the 2030 emissions gap, avoid reliance on carbon removals which cannot compensate for reducing real emissions and ensure the UAE Dialogue delivers progress and turns GST1 guidance into nationally determined action.
Protect Civic Spaces, Gender Equality, & the Integrity of Climate Governance
The EU should emphasise that the success of global climate action depends on the protection of human rights, civic space, and public participation, and that these must be central to both EU external action and its engagement in the UNFCCC. The EU’s approach should be underpinned by the conclusions of the International Court of Justice in its Advisory Opinion of 2025, stating that a clean, healthy and sustainable environment is a precondition for the enjoyment of human rights such as the right to life, the right to health and the right to an adequate standard of living, including access to water, food and housing. At COP30, the EU should actively support the meaningful participation of civil society, Indigenous Peoples, youth, persons with disabilities, and other rights-holders in climate governance – including in the design, implementation and review of NDCs. EU domestic and external action should actively support, rather than constrain, the ability of civil society to engage freely and meaningfully in climate governance.
The EU must support a decision at COP30 that safeguards environmental defenders, ensures access to climate information, and protects freedom of expression and assembly. It should also embed rights-based approaches into all climate and energy diplomacy, including defending independent media, scientific integrity, and factual communication, in line with the principles of the Aarhus Convention.
CAN Europe stresses the importance of strengthening the integrity and accountability of UNFCCC processes. The EU should support the adoption of a conflict of interest policy and champion reforms to Host Country Agreements (HCAs), ensuring they are transparent, publicly available, and include binding human rights protections as a prerequisite for hosting COPs. These reforms are essential now that we are in the implementation phase of the Paris Agreement, and the EU should lead in demonstrating how a rights-based and accountable UNFCCC system can better support effective, inclusive climate action that addresses the undue influence of fossil fuel interests, corporate lobbyists, and other non-rights-based actors.
In this context, the EU should also support measures to prevent corporate capture of the UNFCCC process. This includes advancing an Accountability Framework that clearly defines and addresses conflicts of interest, restricts the influence of high-emitting industries in decision-making spaces, and ensures that COP Presidencies and sponsorships are free from polluter involvement. Without such safeguards, the credibility and integrity of global climate governance risk being undermined. Building on this, the EU should underline that meaningful climate action cannot coexist with the unchecked influence of industries most responsible for the crisis.
The EU must also recognise the People’s Summit in Belém as an integral space where civil society and social movements articulate transformative solutions. The Summit should be seen as part of the accountability ecosystem, amplifying demands for equity, rights, and climate justice that must inform both the official COP30 negotiations and the Brazilian Presidency’s Action Agenda.
Gender Action Plan
In a context of rising conservative, anti-rights governments and accelerated rollback on
gender equality and environmental justice, the new Gender Action Plan (GAP) expected to be adopted at COP30, should serve as a bulwark against regressive forces.
Considering the opportunity created by the extension of the Lima Work Program on Gender (ELWPG) for 10 years, and following up on intense work provided by many parties and civil society observers (WGC) during SB62 and Africa Climate Week, the EU should champion a strong and ambitious GAP in Belem, with no backsliding.
The GAP should provide clear, implementable, and impactful deliverables to avoid overburdening national gender and climate change focal points. This requires capacity building at all levels, accessible to grassroots and Indigenous communities, linked to NDCs, NAPs, the Global Stocktake, LTSs, and BTRs. Participation must increase locally, with institutionalised safe spaces and concrete protections against gender-based violence and explicit support for Women and Environmental Human Rights Defenders (WEHRDs) and Sexual and Reproductive Health and Rights.
EU members can also lead by example in strengthening and assessing the role of National Gender and Climate Change Focal Points (NGCCFPs), ensuring their effective participation across all processes. Furthermore, the EU should stand firm on the inclusion and assessment of multidimensional factors and emerging issues, both in the understanding of gender and climate change related terminology and in the development of frameworks and intersectional approaches, moving from gender-responsive towards gender-transformative climate action. In addition, the EU must commit to supporting the generation, collection and systematic use of gender- and age-disaggregated data (Activity D5) as the basis for monitoring and accountability. The EU must support GAP activities that will help track gender-responsive climate finance flows.
Gender should also be strongly referenced in the Just Transition Work Program, including care work, and across all finance items, especially with regard to NDCs, NAPs and Adaptation Finance in terms of the quality of and access to climate finance and the provision of gender-responsive finance.
The EU should work to ensure that all Parties remain progressive and collaborative throughout the GAP negotiations, safeguarding the ambitious and cooperative spirit established in the preparatory workshops.The EU should emphasize that the GAP must deliver context specific and needs-based measures that empower all actors and ensure gender-responsive, leaning towards gender-transformative climate action.
