POSITION PAPER: The nuclear hurdle to a renewable future and fossil fuel phase-out

More than three-quarters of the EU’s greenhouse gas emissions stem from our energy consumption, therefore it is vital to stop burning fossil fuels to limit temperature rise to 1.5°C, the Paris Agreement target. Together with members, and external experts, we developed our Paris Agreement compatible (PAC) energy scenario, which provides a robust, science-based pathway for Europe’s energy landscape. On the basis of this work, CAN Europe advocates for a phase-out of coal by 2030, gas by 2035, and a 100% renewables-based energy system by 2040, which requires the phase-out of nuclear power by then. The disruption of nuclear power can be observed in many countries, not only in Europe. In Dubai, at COP28, CAN was strongly opposed to and called out countries, supporting and signing the pledge led by the USA, UK, France and 18 other countries to globally triple nuclear power in the next 25 years. This goal is much higher than the high bracket of International Energy Agency (IEA) scenarios, already based on improbable hypotheses and risks to distract from the tripling of Renewable Energy capacities that was agreed by a much larger group of countries at COP28. In 2023, there was an alarming push and a surge in support for nuclear power within the EU political space. This development is creating significant tension with proponents of energy sufficiency and a fully renewable energy system and marks a regressive step in efforts towards a sustainable and just energy transition. While nuclear champions claim that nuclear energy can work hand-in-hand with renewables, it is becoming increasingly clear that nuclear power acts as a significant hurdle to energy efficiency investments, the roll-out of renewables and fossil fuel phase-out in three spheres: the EU political debate, energy system planning, and decentralisation. Climate Action Network International, the global umbrella under which CAN Europe participates, with a community of almost 2000 members from civil society, in more than 130 countries, stands united in opposing new and existing nuclear power stations. In 2020, we reviewed and agreed the CAN Charta, the ‘highest’ document for all CAN members, the international secretariat and the regional nodes, and we listed under strategies “Promoting a nuclear-free future”. A hurdle in the policy debate The starting gun for a renewed attempt at a nuclear renaissance was the inclusion of nuclear in the EU Taxonomy in 2022, and can be seen as the nuclear lobby’s blueprint for its future ambitions – creating a large political debate using arguments of “technology neutrality” and a “level playing field” and forming alliances with fossil fuel advocates (in this case, fossil gas) in order to reduce ambition to sustainable solutions. Since then, a French-led campaign, manifested through the 14 Member State “Nuclear Alliance”, coupled alongside the lobbying activities of the nuclear industry, has run roughshod through EU energy and climate policy over the last two years. Continuing the narrative of “technology neutrality” and a “level playing field”, this mission has aimed at promoting nuclear energy at the direct expense of a transition to a 100% renewable-based energy system, in legislation such as the Renewable Energy Directive, Electricity Market Design and Net Zero Industry Act. Attempting to lower renewable ambition In the context of the Renewable Energy Directive (RED III) revision, France tested the waters in 2023 by calling for a low-carbon ‘weighting’ in EU renewables target in order to support a higher EU 2030 renewable energy target of 45%, where so-called ‘low carbon’ energy sources are taken into account when establishing national renewable energy targets. Though this did not see the light, a concession was won on renewable hydrogen and gained provisions to facilitate nuclear-produced hydrogen – risking further watering down a renewables-based technology pathway. The EU Commission launched its proposal for the Net Zero Industry Act (NZIA) in March 2023 as a response to the Inflation Reduction Act (IRA) of the United States. While nuclear was included as a list of technologies that were seen as making a contribution to decarbonisation, the EU Commission President, Ursula von der Leyen, refused to include it in the list of “strategic technologies”, which could receive additional support. The list was limited, as to be better targeted, at technologies such as solar, wind, energy storage, heat pumps and grid technologies. The final political agreement has led to the inclusion of “nuclear fission energy technologies” as strategic, while this debate allowed the list to become so extensive it practically loses any strategic element. Delaying fossil phase out via dirty trade-offs During the Electricity Market Design reform, nuclear and fossil fuel promoters in the Parliament attempted to derail a deal supporting renewables and flexibility. In the Council, due to the focus of the Nuclear Alliance on the Contracts for Difference (supported by some coal dependent countries) the negotiations were delayed by several months and conversations redirected away from renewables, leading to a deal supporting subsidies for existing and new nuclear reactors and a prolongation of subsidies to coal power plants via capacity mechanisms. Wasting time and diverting attention As the nuclear debate aggressively dominates political negotiations, media, and public discourse, it blatantly diverts critical attention from advancing the existing, affordable, sustainable solutions to the energy transition. This overwhelming focus on nuclear power not only overshadows but also poses a risk of derailing the European energy transition, hindering progress towards aligning with the ambitious yet achievable goal of a 100% renewable energy system by 2040. A hurdle to a fully renewables based power system CAN Europe’s assessment of the draft National Energy and Climate Plans highlights that not a single Member State plan is aligned to a 1.5ºC compatible trajectory, nor minimum EU climate and energy requirements for 2030. Increased ambition is required on energy efficiency, energy savings, renewables and fossil fuels phase-out, while Member States are betting on false solutions to the challenge at hand, such as nuclear energy. As highlighted in our NECP analysis, the EU has inadequate renewables expansion, grossly insufficient investment in energy efficiency, late coal phase-out deadlines and gas dependence, while countries such as Bulgaria, Czechia, Estonia, France, Hungary, the Netherlands, Poland, Romania and Slovenia, are considering new nuclear that might never materialise. In 2023, Sweden has revised its 2040 target for 100% renewable electricity to 100% decarbonised electricity, to allow for continued and new nuclear power, and it is now clear that it can only happen with direct state aid. Italy, which voted against nuclear power in a referendum, is now investigating future nuclear power, while delaying quitting coal by 4 years. The largest nuclear power plant in Europe, the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant in Ukraine, is currently occupied by the Russian military and Rosatom in an active warzone, but has not prevented Ukraine from including new nuclear power in its reconstruction. The Paris Agreement Compatible (PAC) scenario, on the other hand, emphasises renewables-based electrification, calling for determined and heightened attention to enable a 100% renewable-based EU energy system by 2040, and foresees no need for nuclear power in Europe. Nuclear power is too expensive When compared to renewables, the latest analysis from World Nuclear Industry Status Report, using the data from Lazard, determines that the levelized cost of energy (LCOE) for new nuclear plants makes it the most expensive generator, estimated to be nearly four times more expensive than onshore wind, while unsubsidized solar and wind combined with energy storage (to ensure grid balancing) is always cheaper than new nuclear. When compared against energy savings, analysis by Hungarian NGO Clean Air Action Group highlights that it is more economically efficient to invest in the renovation of households to save energy than in the construction, operation, and decommissioning of a new nuclear reactor. These findings were confirmed by a separate study by Greenpeace France, that showed that by investing 52 billion euros in a mix of onshore wind infrastructure/photovoltaic panels on large roofs, it would be possible to avoid four times more CO2 emissions than by investing the same amount in the construction of six EPR2 nuclear reactors by 2050, while electricity production triples. By investing 85 billion euros of government subsidies in energy savings by 2033, it would be possible to avoid six times more cumulative CO2 emissions by 2050 than with the construction program of six EPR 2 reactors. This would also make it possible to lift almost 12 million people out of energy poverty in a decade. Recent European projects in Slovakia, the UK, France, and Finland demonstrate the dramatic rising costs. EDF admitted that the costs for the British nuclear facility Hinkley Point C will skyrocket to 53.8 billion euros for the scheduled 3.2 GW power plant, more than twice as much as scheduled in 2015 when the plant was approved. The French project in Flamanville was originally projected to cost 3.3 billion euros when it began construction in 2007, but has since risen to 13.2 billion euros (16.87 billion euros in today’s money). The Finnish Olkiluoto-3 project 1.6GW reactor cost 3 times more than the original forecast price, reaching 11 billion euros. Slovakia’s second generation reactors Mochovce 3 and 4 ballooned costs to 6.4 billion euros from an initially estimated 2.8 billion. Slovenia’s president announced that a new 1.6GW reactor would cost 11 billion euros, following the Finnish example, demonstrating that these high prices are here to stay. In order to finance new and ongoing projects, the EU has approved State Aid for nuclear, in the case of Hungary, Belgium, and the United Kingdom, while national governments seek support schemes. Despite making references to technology-neutrality, this creates an unlevel playing field slanted against renewable energy. Given the significant investment gap to achieve 2030 climate targets, and the limited fiscal space of many Member States, investments in nuclear risk diverting precious public resources into projects of poor value-for-money compared to alternatives in a renewables-based system, while reducing the availability of public resources for all other components of the energy transition. Such a choice would equally fail to reduce prices for consumers in the context of the current fossil fuel energy crisis. Finally, the costs would be even larger if accounting for “unpaid externalities” borne by taxpayers and the public at large, from nuclear accident risks that are impossible to insure against by private actors. The costs of decommissioning of a nuclear power plant, which can cost 1-1.5 billion euros per 1000 MW, are often borne by the public as these costs are poorly taken into account when planning a new nuclear installation. The cost associated with storing radioactive waste for hundreds of thousands of years is also often undervalued, alongside costs associated with radioactive leaks from plants or storage facilities, as demonstrated by the radioactive leaks in the UK Sellafield site, causing tension with Ireland and Norway. To lower costs, attempted lowering of safety and environmental standards can be expected, posing risks to communities, nature, and society at large, also as a burden to future generations. New nuclear construction is too slow A rapid transition requires the use of existing technologies and solutions which can most quickly be rolled-out such as renewables, primarily solar and wind, energy efficiency, and system flexibility. For years, new nuclear energy projects in Europe have been plagued with delays and, coupled with an untrained workforce, are unable to support the speed of decarbonisation necessary. New nuclear plants typically take 15-20 years for construction, hence failing to address immediate decarbonisation needs to 2030. Indicatively, France’s six new reactors are estimated by its network operator to enter into use in 2040-2049, much too late to have any meaningful impact on emissions reduction needed already now, with a view to pathways to 2050, and beyond, for a sustainable future. The decision to build the UK’s Hinkley Point C nuclear reactor was announced in 2007 with an operational start date of 2017, however it has been delayed several times over, and is now estimated to start in 2031. In France, the Flamanville project is 16 years into construction and hitting new delays, while Finland’s Olkiluoto took a full 18 years to come online. Nuclear does not support energy autonomy Nuclear power units equally fail to pass an “energy security” test, and run counter to the RepowerEU target of enhancing Europe’s autonomy, given that more than 40% of the EU’s Uranium is imported from Russia and no EU country is currently mining uranium within its own borders . Though Kazakhstan is seen as an alternative, its uranium industry is directly tied to Rosatom. While import bans have been placed on Russian coal and liquified natural gas, and Russian oil and natural gas have been targeted, this has not been the case for uranium. A hurdle to a decentralised future The declaration to triple nuclear power by 2050 signed by only 22 countries, 5 of which do not have nuclear reactors, on the sidelines of COP28 describes nuclear power as “source of clean dispatchable baseload power”, a common message of the nuclear industry used to argue against a 100% renewable system and nuclear’s use as a substitute for traditional fossil fuel generation. This claim, however, is misleading and outdated. Europe is moving beyond a highly centralised energy system, towards one which is decentralised, digitalised, and able to flexibly adjust to changing patterns of generation and consumption. In a 100% renewable energy system, the need for traditional “baseload” power is obsolete and with distributed energy production, in a far more interconnected European Union, security of supply is better managed. Nuclear power production is not reliable Nuclear power units across Europe have been proven as unreliable in providing power when needed. Future climatic conditions, such as heatwaves, droughts, flooding and rising sea-levels only increase the likelihood of future nuclear power plant disconnections and pose further security risks. In 2022, on average French nuclear reactors had 152 days with zero-production. Over half of the French nuclear reactor fleet was not available during at least one-third of the year, one-third was not available for more than half of the year, and 98% of the year 10 reactors or more did not provide any power for at least part of the day. The myth of the need for nuclear baseload has been debunked for years. The energy system can be reliably and safely managed with 100% renewables and system flexibility. Blocking renewables integration into the electricity grid The inflexibility of nuclear, caused by technical limitations, safety requirements and economic factors, prevents the feed-in of renewable electricity into the grid, causing grid congestion and curtailment. Nuclear’s dominance over grid capacity can block the connection of new renewable energy projects, where even announced and then abandoned plans for a new nuclear unit can delay renewable projects connection, allowing for continued fossil fuel usage. Grid structures designed for large-scale, centralised nuclear power, make it more challenging, time-consuming and costly to introduce small-scale distributed renewable power. An example can be found in Romania where Cernavodă 3 and 4 reactors have reserved grid capacity for years, blocking new renewable energy projects in the Dobrogea region, the most wind-intensive region in the country. Delayed grid investments, due to uncertainty of new nuclear units, have also meant that capacity bottlenecks exist today for renewables online. In the Netherlands, the only current nuclear power station, Borssele is competing for landing space for off-shore electricity. Post-Fukushima, renewables were blocked from connecting to the grid in Japan as the government considered restarting the reactors, despite public opposition to nuclear restarts and support for renewables. Rather than taking the opportunity to invest in grids and integrate renewables twenty years ago, Japan still heavily relies on fossil fuels today. Prolonging the inevitable with nuclear extensions While European governments may be tempted to prolong existing nuclear reactors beyond their original foreseen lifespans, in the context of phasing out Russian gas, costly upgrades to the ageing nuclear fleet, just like investing in new ones, risks diverting investment away from more cost-effective solutions such as renewables, energy efficiency, and system flexibility, in addition to risking lowered safety standards and security of supply as ageing increases unplanned outages. Any prolongation of existing nuclear power plant units risks the continued crowding out of renewable energy sources from the electricity grid, preventing their price-dampening effects on the market. So-called “Small Modular Reactors” European lawmakers are increasingly persuaded by the empty promises of Small Modular Reactors (SMRs). Argued to be more flexible, decentralised, smaller, and cheaper than existing nuclear designs, countries are wasting public resources in favour of a non-existent product, riddled with the same limitations as their predecessors, and presenting poor value-for-money compared to existing alternatives. The focus on SMRs risks delaying the development of renewable energy technologies already available at the moment, and thereby prolonging the usage of fossil fuels., , Burdened by the same high capital costs, SMRs would have to run near constantly to reduce losses, thereby further congesting the grid and making them useless in providing back-up power needed for peak hours against renewables and energy storage. Nuclear energy is too risky and unsafe Nuclear technology inherently carries the risk of severe nuclear accidents with the release of large amounts of radioactivity as shown by catastrophic accidents in Fukushima or Chornobyl. Extreme and more frequent weather events due to climate change create unprecedented risks through storms or flooding that are not captured in planning standards for nuclear plants based on historic frequencies and severeness. Extreme weather events may also indirectly affect nuclear plants, such as breaking dams above nuclear plants or longer disconnection from electricity grids after storms. Cyber attacks, military aggression e.g. Russia’s occupation of the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant, and terrorist attacks, e.g. via drone attacks, could also lead to severe accidents of nuclear plants. Nuclear waste remains a risk worldwide to the health of all living creatures, including humans, for thousands of years after its use in energy production. Management of any future storage facility would still be at risk of natural disasters and decisions of future generations, whereas currently without any long-term solutions risks are increasingly shifting to interim storage which were not planned for the current supply and length of storage. Beyond decarbonisation For heightened climate ambition, renewables, energy efficiency, storage, interconnection and flexibility are best suited to make up this gap in generation and support increased renewables-based electrification, while phasing out fossil fuels in parallel. Given the poor speed and high costs of future nuclear projects, the difficulty to build several units at the same time, and the realities of SMRs, it is unlikely nuclear will be able to cover any significant part of Europe’s energy needs by 2040. The future energy system will be far more decentralised, and active consumer and flexibility oriented, which are not the ideal conditions for new nuclear plants. For these reasons stated above, it is in the nuclear industry’s interest to delay Europe’s progress and keep in place the current centralised, fossil-based energy system, jeopardising climate goals, in the hope that projects are able to materialise in the future, and to lower safety standards to reduce costs. Nuclear energy is also at odds with an energy system based on democratic ownership of energy production, as opposed to renewables. A true democratic debate on nuclear has not been underway, but rather a capture by geopolitical interests and corporations. Problems in three identified spheres, the political debate, energy system planning, and decentralisation have been mapped as current and possible future areas where nuclear advocates may be actively hostile towards renewables and fossil fuel phase out. Though we must look beyond energy and decarbonisation, and have a holistic vision of nuclear power, incorporating drawbacks such as safety, waste, weapon proliferation, uranium dependency, operation in warzones and biodiversity. Conclusion On the basis of the analysis above, CAN Europe concludes the following:

Nuclear energy is undermining renewables due to the aforementioned issues and must not be portrayed as an alternative or partner for renewables in the energy transition.
New nuclear energy in Europe is too slow, and too expensive to meaningfully contribute to the decarbonisation of the energy system by 2040. This pathway is a distraction which only delays fossil fuel phase-out and renewables uptake.
Small Modular Reactors are an unproven technology and, like conventional nuclear reactor designs, are unable to contribute meaningfully to decarbonisation. If developed, these units would increase the price for electricity, the levels of radioactive waste and risk the proliferation of nuclear materials.
CAN Europe calls for a 100% renewable energy system by 2040, and therefore a managed phase-out and decommissioning of Europe’s existing nuclear fleet is required by 2040 at the latest to ensure a safe and sustainable future.
Prolongation must not divert public funds away from renewables and energy efficiency solutions and hinder the integration of renewables in the surrounding area. The prolongation of existing nuclear reactors risks safety as old units are pushed well beyond their original foreseen lifespans.
Every euro invested in nuclear is a euro not invested in renewables and energy efficiency. For this reason, public finance should remain inaccessible to nuclear, as it should be prioritised on cost-effective, sustainable solutions. This includes the EU’s Multiannual Financial Framework and EU funds such as the Just Transition Fund, Modernisation Fund, Innovation Fund, InvestEU, etc, and investments from the European Investment Bank.
Renewable energy targets remain an essential tool for the European energy transition, and must be defended against any attempts to water them down through the inclusion of nuclear power. A so-called “low-carbon” directive with “low-carbon” targets would decimate the rate of renewable energy integration, which is already off track, and prevent the EU from aligning with Paris-agreement emissions reduction. Additionally, this opens the backdoor for other false solutions like fossil gas and carbon-capture and storage (CCS).
Nuclear power and fossil gas should be excluded from the EU taxonomy for sustainable activities.